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PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS AND PRAGMATISM 
RICHARD C. BOLDT* 
ABSTRACT 
Problem-solving courts have emerged in the United States as a 
significant feature on the criminal justice system landscape.  De-
spite efforts to articulate a common set of governing principles, 
the problem-solving courts movement has been, for the most part, 
an atheoretical enterprise.  The avoidance of theory, however, 
carries costs, particularly when individual decisionmakers seek 
to chart a course that is highly discretionary.  Suitable tools are 
available to help organize thinking about the nature of the prob-
lems that problem-solving courts address and the solutions they 
attempt.  These tools are derived from the insights of legal and 
philosophical pragmatism.  This Article employs pragmatist theo-
ry to press focus on the nature of the problem solving undertaken 
by drug treatment courts and other specialized courts.  It begins 
with an introduction to problem-solving courts and their embrace 
of practical pragmatic approaches to justice system dysfunction, 
and contrasts this ordinary pragmatism with the sort of theoreti-
cal pragmatism offered by John Dewey and his intellectual heirs.  
It then provides a brief overview of the chief arguments that were 
directed against early pragmatist thinkers and the counterargu-
ments they offered in response, as well as similar arguments and 
counterarguments that have resurfaced more recently in response 
to newer forms of legal and philosophical pragmatism.  In light of 
these arguments and counterarguments, the Article considers 
how pragmatist theory can inform the exercise of judgment by ac-
tors engaged in framing legal problems and developing legal so-
lutions.  The Article concludes by setting out two examples that 
help to show how a rigorous pragmatist approach can sharpen 
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our understanding of problem-solving courts and the problem-
solving courts movement. 
INTRODUCTION 
Problem-solving courts have emerged in the United States as a signifi-
cant feature on the criminal justice system landscape.1  There are now well 
over 3,000 specialized courts in the United States that pursue a problem-
solving approach.2  The majority of these problem-solving courts are fo-
cused on offenders who misuse drugs.3  Other specialized courts have been 
established, however, to address homelessness, mental illness, family vio-
lence, and other concerns that proponents believe are suitable to a problem-
solving methodology.4  In addition to the continued expansion of this uni-
verse of separate problem-solving courts, advocates eager to see problem-
solving jurisprudence “go to scale” are now encouraging court systems 
around the country to adopt policies that would facilitate the incorporation 
of problem-solving practices more broadly into ordinary criminal courts and 
other general jurisdiction courts.5  These efforts to develop and expand 
problem-solving jurisprudence have received support from leaders within 
the bench and bar.6  In 2000, the United States Conference of Chief Justices 
and the Conference of State Court Administrators approved a joint resolu-
tion calling for the “broad integration” of problem-solving methods into the 
criminal justice system.7  Subsequently, the American Bar Association 
                                                          
 1.  Pamela M. Casey & David B. Rottman, Problem-Solving Courts: Models and Trends, 26 
JUST. SYS. J. 35, 35 (2005).  Many observers trace the beginning of the problem-solving courts 
movement to the establishment of the first drug treatment court in Dade County, Florida, in the 
late 1980s.  Candace McCoy, The Politics of Problem-Solving: An Overview of the Origins and 
Development of Therapeutic Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513, 1517 (2003). 
 2.  Corey Shdaimah, Taking a Stand in a Not-So-Perfect World: What’s a Critical Supporter 
of Problem-Solving Courts to Do?, 10 MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 89, 89 
(2010). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING 
JUSTICE 3 (2005) (noting that an “innovative group of judges and attorneys ha[ve] begun to test 
new ways of doing justice, reengineering how courts address such everyday problems as quality-
of-life crime, drugs, and domestic violence”); JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., LEGAL ACCENTS, LEGAL 
BORROWING: THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT MOVEMENT 8 (2009) (same); 
Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 LAW & POL’Y 125, 
125 (2001) (same). 
 5.  ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, PRINCIPLES OF PROBLEM-SOLVING 
JUSTICE 1–2 (2007); Donald J. Farole, Jr. et al., Applying Problem-Solving Principles in Main-
stream Courts: Lessons for State Courts, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 57, 57–58 (2005) (some states, includ-
ing California, New York, Missouri, Louisiana, and Ohio, have adopted this specialized problem 
solving approach on a statewide level). 
 6.  Farole, Jr. et al., supra note 5, at 57–58. 
 7.  CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES & CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, 
RESOLUTION 22: IN SUPPORT OF PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PRINCIPLES AND METHODS (adopted 
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passed a resolution encouraging public and private entities to support “edu-
cation and training about the principles and methods employed by problem-
solving courts.”8 
Advocates and others associated with the problem-solving courts 
movement have sought to identify a set of core characteristics shared gener-
ally by these undertakings.  To this end, researchers at the Center for Court 
Innovation have developed “performance indicators” for evaluating “prob-
lem-solving justice,” which they have grouped into three organizing princi-
ples.9  The first is termed a “problem-solving orientation,” which they de-
fine as “a focus on solving the underlying problems of litigants, victims, or 
communities.”10  This orientation, they explain, most often “implies an in-
terest in individual rehabilitation,” but on occasion “the defining ‘problems’ 
of interest belong less to the presenting litigant than to the victims of crime, 
including the larger community.”11  The second organizing principle is 
“collaboration.”12  This principle “highlights the role of interdisciplinary 
collaboration with players both internal and external to the justice sys-
tem.”13  Consistent with its emphasis on the rehabilitation of offenders and 
the provision of therapeutic and other social services to individuals en-
meshed in the criminal system, the problem-solving model’s collaboration 
principle contemplates the integration of adjudicative, penal, and human 
services professionals into interdisciplinary teams, often operating under the 
supervision of criminal court judges.14  The third principle is “accountabil-
ity,” which “focuses on promoting compliance by participants/litigants, 
quality services among service providers, and accountability by the court 
itself to the larger community.”15 
Despite these efforts to articulate a common set of governing princi-
ples, a wide range of institutional structures and a diverse set of practices 
                                                          
Aug. 3, 2000), available at 
http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/CourtAdminResolutions/ProblemSolvingCourtPrinciplesAndMethods.pdf.  
 8.  NOLAN, supra note 4, at 7. 
 9.  RACHEL PORTER ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, WHAT MAKES A COURT PROBLEM-
SOLVING? iii (2010). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id.   
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id.   
 14.  Mitchell B. Mackinem & Paul Higgins, Introduction to PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: 
JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? i, vii (Paul Higgins & Mitchell B. Mackinem eds., 
2009). 
 15.  PORTER ET AL., supra note 9, at iv; see also WOLF, supra note 5, at 7 (“By insisting on 
regular and rigorous compliance monitoring—and clear consequences for non-compliance—the 
justice system can improve the accountability of offenders.  It can also improve the accountability 
of service providers by requiring regular reports on their work with participants.”). 
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have been adopted by the various courts associated with this movement.16  
One leading advocate has observed that “[t]here is no single foundational 
document, no unified theory, that summoned problem-solving courts into 
existence.”17  Given the incremental and local nature of their development 
and the lack of a single authoritative blueprint for their design and opera-
tion, it should come as little surprise that the “problems” addressed and the 
“solutions” attempted by these courts vary considerably.18  Nevertheless, a 
consistent theme in the problem-solving courts literature is that they seek 
“to address a ‘broken system’ symbolized by a ‘revolving door’ through 
which repeat offenders continually circulate while underlying problems re-
main ignored.”19  This narrative of a “broken system” vexed by a “revolv-
ing door” of “repeat offenders” has embedded within it anxieties over a 
spectrum of “problems” ranging from highly specific individual pathologies 
to general systemic dysfunction. 
There are, of course, deep connections between the problems suffered 
by individual offenders, including substance misuse and mental disability, 
that may contribute to their becoming involved in the criminal justice sys-
tem; the problems associated with the administration of the criminal justice 
system itself, which are caused in part by the overwhelming volume of re-
cidivating offenders; the problems of institutional legitimacy wrought by 
the mass processing required in such a system; and the broadest problems 
of a civil society whose non-legal institutions increasingly have failed to 
contribute effectively to the management or amelioration of individual and 
societal pathologies and to the enterprise of maintaining social cohesion and 
social control.20  But it matters where on this continuum of problems a legal 
intervention is focused, even if the problems on the continuum are interre-
lated.  Thus, problem-solving courts that select an individualizing approach 
targeting the addiction, homelessness, or mental illness of the offenders 
who appear before them are likely to articulate a different rationale for the 
                                                          
 16.  See PORTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 2 (recognizing “the wide variation across today’s 
problem-solving court models”). 
 17.  Greg Berman, Problem-Solving Justice and the Moment of Truth, in PROBLEM-SOLVING 
COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?, supra note 14, at 1, 3–4. 
 18.  See PORTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 1 (noting that problem-solving courts “each seek to 
address a different set of problems”). 
 19.  Victoria Malkin, Problem-Solving in Community Courts: Who Decides the Problem?, in 
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?, supra note 14, at 139. 
 20.  NOLAN, supra note 4, at 7–10 (“Ubiquitous, for example, are complaints about over-
crowded jails and prisons; the expense and burden of increasing court case loads; the ‘revolving 
door’ phenomenon of repeat offenders; the impersonal and assembly-line quality of ‘McJustice,’ 
or expedited case management; fatigue and job dissatisfaction among lawyers and judges; the win-
at-all-costs mentality of modern trial advocacy; and the adjudicative restrictions of hyper-
proceduralism and mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines.”). 
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specialized structures and practices they have adopted than other courts 
aimed at different problems located at other points on the spectrum.21 
The problem-solving courts movement frequently is associated with 
two other innovations that have taken root within the criminal justice sys-
tem over the past several decades.  The first is therapeutic jurisprudence, a 
perspective developed most prominently by Bruce Winick and David 
Wexler,22 which seeks to encourage the use of legal processes that are 
thought to be therapeutic and to discourage those that are likely to under-
mine the well-being of persons impacted by the legal system.23  The second 
is restorative justice, an approach often associated with Australian crimi-
nologist John Braithwaite,24 which promotes a form of legal engagement 
designed “to repair the harm” suffered by individual victims and by whole 
communities as a consequence of criminal conduct.25  While at least one 
observer has described therapeutic jurisprudence, restorative justice, and 
problem-solving courts as interrelated phenomena that function together as 
part of a “comprehensive law movement,”26 James Nolan has argued per-
suasively that it is better to conceive of therapeutic jurisprudence and re-
storative justice as theoretical perspectives distinct from problem-solving 
courts, which he understands to be “a practical legal innovation.”27 
                                                          
 21.  See PORTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 2 (discussing three problem-solving court paradigms, 
identified as “(1) therapeutic jurisprudence, (2) accountability, and (3) community justice”). 
 22.  See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 184, 185–86 (1997) (noting that, since its inception, therapeutic jurisprudence 
has evolved, from “a lens for examining mental health law to a therapeutic approach to the law as 
a whole”).  Therapeutic jurisprudence has similarly attracted a following in other countries: “This 
emerging comparative law approach holds great promise for enriching the field of therapeutic ju-
risprudence.”  Id. at 204. 
 23.  See id. at 185 (“Therapeutic jurisprudence proposes the exploration of ways in which, 
consistent with principles of justice and other constitutional values, the knowledge, theories, and 
insights of the mental health and related disciplines can help shape the development of the law.”); 
NOLAN, supra note 4, at 32 (stating that therapeutic jurisprudence “understands the law ‘to func-
tion as a kind of therapist or therapeutic agent’”); Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 14, at viii–ix 
(“Courts based on therapeutic jurisprudence operate within an ethic of caring.  These courts . . . 
explicitly focus on helping the defendant because the court leaders believe that a healthier defend-
ant is less likely to commit future crime.”). 
 24.  See John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 244, 246 (2002) (“Restorative Justice is a process where all stakeholders involved in an 
injustice have an opportunity to discuss its effects on people and to decide what is to be done to 
attempt to heal those hurts.”).  
 25.  Richard Young & Carolyn Hoyle, Restorative Justice and Punishment, in THE USE OF 
PUNISHMENT 199, 200 (Seán McConville ed., 2003).  
 26.  Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Within the Comprehensive Law 
Movement, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS HELPING PROFESSION 465, 
466–67 (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000). 
 27.  NOLAN, supra note 4, at 32.  Mackinem and Higgins have observed: “While distinct from 
restorative justice and therapeutic jurisprudence, problem-solving courts draw support from these 
other two movements.”  Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 14, at viii. 
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To be sure, there may be some relationship between practice within a 
given problem-solving court and one or the other of these theoretical 
frameworks.  Courts that are focused primarily on helping individual de-
fendants with the mental disabilities or other problems that accompany their 
criminal conduct28 are most likely to engage the basic tenets of therapeutic 
jurisprudence.29  Other problem-solving courts that are concerned especially 
about the needs of crime victims and crime-impacted communities, and 
about the legitimacy of the law enforcement and justice systems, are more 
likely to adopt both the rhetoric and the instruction of the restorative justice 
literature.30  But the general affinity of some problem-solving courts with 
either therapeutic jurisprudence or restorative justice does not mean that 
these “practical legal innovations” are either guided directly by those theo-
retical perspectives or owe their origins to their basic insights. 
The problem-solving courts movement has been shaped most promi-
nently not by a foundational theoretical perspective but by an essentially 
pragmatic set of instincts.31  As Greg Berman, one of the architects of the 
movement, has put it: “the movement has not so much been ‘born out of 
theory’ as advanced by ‘practitioners on the ground, struggling to do some-
thing better than what they were doing.’”32  In this sense, the development 
of problem-solving specialty courts has been, for the most part, an “atheo-
retical” enterprise in which legal and human services professionals are 
guided by the concrete cues of everyday experience and not by the abstract 
direction suggested by top-down theory.33  The avoidance of theory, how-
ever, carries costs, particularly when individual decisionmakers seek to 
chart a course that is highly discretionary and that is not hedged in by sig-
nificant formal procedural constraints.34 
                                                          
 28.  See Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 14, at viii (describing judges in problem-solving 
courts as “‘coaches’ in the application of ‘social science principles’ through deliberate ‘plan-
ning’”). 
 29.  See PORTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 2 (“This paradigm promotes a coordinated and re-
medial response to the underlying service needs of the involved parties . . .  [It] is most commonly 
associated with drug and mental health courts, whose main purpose is to treat and rehabilitate the 
individual (i.e., reducing drug use, mental illness, and recidivism).”). 
 30.  See id. (“This paradigm focuses less on treatment and more on holding defendants (or 
other litigants) responsible for their behavior and on increasing judicial supervision to deter future 
criminal behavior.”). 
 31.  See Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 14, at ix (“Problem-solving courts do not derive 
from therapeutic jurisprudence.  Problem-solving courts develop from pragmatic local concerns 
about specific problematic community conditions.”). 
 32.  NOLAN, supra note 4, at 36. 
 33.  Id. (quoting JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 
2003)). 
 34.  See Jeffrey Fagan & Victoria Malkin, Theorizing Community Justice Through Communi-
ty Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897, 900 (2003) (observing that “community justice has been 
under-theorized,” and that “[t]heory matters in this context, offering a causal story about the un-
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Tools are available, however, to help organize thinking about the na-
ture of the problems that problem-solving courts address and the solutions 
they attempt.  These tools are derived from the insights of legal and philo-
sophical pragmatism.  Although linked in important ways to the instinctive, 
atheoretical pragmatism that has energized the problem-solving courts 
movement from its inception, the tradition of legal and philosophical prag-
matism brings a potentially useful theoretical perspective to the tasks of de-
fining and organizing the problems and identifying and assessing the solu-
tions that necessarily must be accomplished by actors engaged in a 
problem-solving jurisprudence.35  A related set of tools has been offered by 
a group of scholars who focus on the natural history through which prob-
lems are formulated and understood as such both by those in conflict and 
those who function as third-party interveners.  A foundational article in this 
field published in 1978 by Robert Emerson and Sheldon Messinger, entitled 
The Micro-Politics of Trouble, is a good starting point for comprehending 
this rigorous approach to the task of problem identification.36 
                                                          
derlying dynamics of change, and identifying potentially enduring and generalizable lessons that 
help us predict whether the practices that are promising in one place would be equally effective in 
another”); see also Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court 
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1261–62 (1998) (discussing procedural informality and judi-
cial discretion in drug treatment courts). 
 35.  For a good introduction to legal pragmatism, see Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spel-
man, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1610 (1990) (describing pragmatism as “a school of 
American philosophic thought . . . committed to examining the consequences and practical effects 
of conceptions when exploring truth, meaning, and action”); see also Richard A. Posner, What 
Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1653–56 (1990) (“The pragmatist’s real 
interest is not in truth at all, but in belief justified by social need.”); Hilary Putnam, A Reconsider-
ation of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1671, 1678–79 (1990) (noting that pragmatists 
acknowledge the importance of experimentation); Margaret Radin, The Pragmatist and the Femi-
nist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1704–10 (1990) (drawing a connection between pragmatism and 
feminism and theorizing that both share a “commitment to finding knowledge in the particulars of 
experience”—that is, “a commitment against abstract idealism, transcendence, foundationalism, 
and atemporal universality”).  For a general discussion of neopragmatism, see Richard Rorty, The 
Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1811, 1812–14 (1990) (not-
ing that “new pragmatists talk about language instead of experience or mind or consciousness, as 
the old pragmatists did”); Cornel West, The Limits of Neopragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1747, 
1747–49 (1990) (“[A]ll neopragmatists are anti-foundationalists; that is, the validation of 
knowledge-claims rests on practical judgments constituted by, and constructed in, dynamic social 
practices.”).  For a discussion of the origins of philosophical pragmatism, see Richard C. Boldt, 
Public Education as Public Space: Some Reflections on the Unfinished Work of Marc Feldman, 
61 MD. L. REV. 13, 23–52 (2002). 
 36.  See Robert M. Emerson & Sheldon L. Messinger, The Micro-Politics of Trouble, 25 SOC. 
PROBS. 121, 121 (1977) (“Our argument assumes that any social setting generates a number of 
evanescent, ambiguous difficulties that may ultimately be—but are not immediately—identified as 
‘deviant.’ . . .  Consideration of the natural history of such problems can provide a fruitful ap-
proach to processes of informal reaction and to their relation to the reactions of official agencies 
of social control.”). 
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Because of their engagement with practice and focus on deriving gov-
erning principles from the consequences of practice, these tools are relevant 
to evaluating and improving a law reform project such as the problem-
solving courts movement.  Accordingly, this Article seeks to employ prag-
matist theory and The Micro-Politics of Trouble to press focus on the nature 
of the problem solving undertaken by drug treatment courts and other spe-
cialized courts.  Drawing on the work of John Dewey and other more con-
temporary pragmatists, this Article argues that the notion of problem solv-
ing employed in these contexts often is under-theorized, and that a more 
fully developed pragmatist perspective could usefully inform this practice. 
Part I of this Article provides an introduction to problem-solving 
courts and their embrace of practical pragmatic approaches to justice system 
dysfunction, and contrasts this ordinary pragmatism with the sort of theoret-
ical pragmatism offered by Dewey and his intellectual heirs.  Part II is de-
voted to pragmatist theory and its critique.  This Part provides a brief over-
view of the chief arguments that were directed against early pragmatist 
thinkers and the counterarguments they offered in response, as well as simi-
lar arguments and counterarguments that resurfaced more recently in re-
sponse to newer forms of legal and philosophical pragmatism.  In light of 
these arguments and counterarguments, Part II then considers how pragma-
tist theory might inform the exercise of judgment by legal actors engaged in 
framing legal problems and developing legal solutions.  Part III sets out two 
examples that help to show how a rigorous, pragmatist jurisprudence could 
sharpen our understanding of problem-solving courts and the problem-
solving courts movement. 
I.  PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS AND THE FORMS OF PRAGMATISM 
The driving force behind the problem-solving courts movement from 
its inception has been an express commitment to efficacy.  This is a com-
mitment to doing what works.37  The focus on efficacy is apparent both in 
the critical account of “traditional courts” articulated by advocates of the 
movement and in the accompanying affirmative counter-story of specialty 
courts that often attends their discussions.  According to this narrative of 
failure and redemption, traditional courts set up to generate a “legal resolu-
tion” in time-limited and subject-matter-limited “cases” through the opera-
                                                          
 37.  See Rekha Mirchandani, What’s So Special About Specialized Courts?  The State and 
Social Change in Salt Lake City’s Domestic Violence Court, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 379, 385 
(2005) (“Special courts promise new methods to help judges and attorneys process cases quickly 
and efficiently . . . with maximum effectiveness . . . .”); cf. Eric Lane, Due Process and Problem-
Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 955, 956 (2003) (noting that the emergence of problem-
solving courts has otherwise engendered serious debate surrounding one of its foundational prin-
ciples; that is, “the problem-solving protocols employed by these courts are effective”).  
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tion of an “adversarial process” have become overwhelmed by a crush of 
offenders with untreated substance misuse, other mental health problems, 
and a host of other unmet human needs who cycle repeatedly through the 
system.38  This breakdown of the traditional court system is the result of a 
perfect storm: the co-occurrence of a broad failure of public and private in-
stitutions—including schools, families, religious institutions, and the public 
healthcare system—that should be dealing more effectively with the indi-
vidual and social pathologies often associated with criminality,39 and the 
persistence of punitive national, state, and local policies toward street crime 
and drug offenses, characterized by the adoption of mandatory minimum 
sentences, “three strikes and you’re out” laws, and the like, which also have 
contributed to system overload.40 
On virtually any reasonable set of criteria, the traditional criminal 
court system is a failure.  It fails individual offenders who are deprived of 
procedural justice because the system cannot afford consistently to provide 
effective defense counsel or full adversarial proceedings,41 instead dispos-
ing of the vast majority of cases through a punitive plea negotiation process 
that does little to address offenders’ underlying human services and health 
care needs.42  It fails the legal professionals working in the system—judges, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys—who “feel frustrated and belittled” by 
the diminished professional discretion left to them in a bureaucratically 
managed assembly-line process of justice.43  And it fails the broader com-
                                                          
 38.  Judith S. Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach, 22 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 125, 128–29 (2004) (“State court dockets tend overwhelmingly to be the stuff of eve-
ryday life: defendants who return to court again and again on a variety of minor criminal charg-
es . . . .  Conventional case processing may dispose of the legal issues in these cases, but it does 
little to address the underlying problems that return these people to court again and again.”); 
Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 14, at viii (“Traditional courts aim to move many cases as fast 
as can be reasonably done.”); see also NOLAN, supra note 4, at 8 (acknowledging “the ‘revolving 
door’ phenomenon of repeat offenders”). 
 39.  Former Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals, for example, has 
been quoted as saying: “We’ve witnessed the breakdown of the family and of other traditional 
safety nets.”  Greg Berman, What Is a Traditional Judge Anyway?  Problem Solving in the State 
Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 78, 80 (2000).  
 40.  See Berman, supra note 17, at 7 (suggesting also that “the intellectual climate had grown 
exceedingly skeptical, if not downright hostile, to the idea of rehabilitation”). 
 41.  E.g., Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving Courts 
and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1474–75 (2004). 
 42.  In 2006, ninety-four percent of all felony convictions in state courts were resolved by 
guilty pleas.  See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES 
IN STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2009).  A classic analysis of the punitive na-
ture of this bureaucratized plea negotiation system was provided some years ago by Malcolm Fee-
ley. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A 
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 25–28 (1979) (discussing “the ‘orthodox’ views of the criminal pro-
cess . . . the Due Process Model, and the other the Plea Bargain Model”).  
 43.  Berman, supra note 17, at 4. 
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munity, which is losing confidence in the criminal justice system and other 
public institutions assigned responsibility for maintaining social cohesion 
and public safety.44 
The affirmative counter-story advanced by problem-solving courts ad-
vocates promises a “collaborative process” in place of the adversarial, due-
process-based proceedings that the system no longer can afford to pro-
vide.45  It offers “therapeutic outcomes” for participants, rather than “legal 
resolutions” for cases.46  Most importantly, it offers the promise of infor-
mal, individualized engagement by judges and other court officials in order 
to find “what works” instead of settling for the operation of formal, rule-
based procedures that do not.47 
A leading judicial supporter of problem-solving courts, former Chief 
Judge of the New York Court of Appeals Judith Kaye, has captured the es-
sentially pragmatic nature of the movement in her published writing on the 
subject.  These courts, she says, “bring together prosecution and defense, 
criminal justice agencies, treatment providers and the like, all working with 
the judge toward a more effective outcome than the costly revolving 
door.”48  Another problem-solving court judge has observed that “‘the sys-
tem from which the problem-solving courts have emerged was a failure on 
any count.  It wasn’t a legal success.  It wasn’t a social success.  It wasn’t 
working.’”49  Specialized problem-solving courts, on the other hand, are 
said to work.  They save money, they reduce recidivism, and they save 
lives.50 
This preoccupation with efficacy, with doing what works, invites a 
consideration of the broader topic of pragmatism.  While advocates of prob-
lem solving in the realm of courts reform occasionally do associate them-
selves with the American tradition of legal and philosophical pragmatism,51 
                                                          
 44.  NOLAN, supra note 4, at 9. 
 45.  Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 14, at viii.  But see Ursula Castellano, Courting Com-
pliance: Case Managers as “Double Agents” in the Mental Health Court, 36 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 484, 508–09 (2011) (providing a more problematic account of the collaboration that 
takes place in mental health courts).  
 46.  Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 14, at viii. 
 47.  Nolan quotes a domestic violence court judge as saying: “[T]o me, if it works, do it.”  
NOLAN, supra note 4, at 144 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 48.  Id. at 224 n.32. 
 49.  Id. at 145. 
 50.  See Berman, supra note 17, at 6–7 (citing drug courts as a practical example of the suc-
cess of specialized problem-solving courts).  It should be noted, however, that there is a relative 
lack of solid outcome research, especially for problem-solving courts other than drug treatment 
courts.  Id. at 6; see also Richard C. Boldt, The “Tomahawk” and the “Healing Balm”: Drug 
Treatment Courts in Theory and Practice, 10 MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 45, 
49–50 (2010) (suggesting that the data on drug treatment court efficacy is mixed). 
 51.  In a footnote, Nolan reports that problem-solving court advocate Greg Berman noted in 
an interview that “he had been reading some of the ‘Richard Posner pragmatism stuff’ and said he 
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the form of pragmatism that has attracted the attention of most problem-
solving court proponents tends not to be the philosophical approach, de-
rived from the work of William James and John Dewey, that involves a 
more exhaustive, rigorous, and continuous rethinking of means and ends.52  
Indeed, pragmatism subsumes more than just a jurisprudential or philosoph-
ical perspective.  The term pragmatism implicates a range of often interre-
lated meanings, each of which potentially could be relevant to the problem-
solving courts movement.  First, a claim of pragmatism could suggest a 
practical, grounded-in-the-real-world, posture that either is actively opposed 
to engagement with theory or, at the least, adopts a passive atheoretical 
stance devoid of abstract thinking.53  Some of those involved with problem-
solving courts have endorsed this approach and have taken the view that 
theirs is a practical endeavor not particularly suited to theory work.54  A 
second potentially relevant meaning is the conventional, nontechnical un-
derstanding of pragmatic decisionmaking as inclined toward the “compro-
mise of principles.”55  A fair amount has been written about the tension be-
tween problem-solving practices in specialty courts and the broad principles 
of due process and procedural fairness.56  In addition, some attention has 
been paid to a perceived incompatibility between problem-solving jurispru-
dence and retributive theory.57  On these terms, one could say that problem-
solving courts are pragmatic to the extent that they dispense with some 
measure of procedural fairness or retributive justice in exchange for the 
much-needed practical benefits they are thought to produce with respect to 
                                                          
thought that ‘there is a lot there’ that is relevant to problem-solving courts.”  NOLAN, supra note 
4, at 225 n.37. 
 52.  See generally WILLIAM JAMES, SELECTED WRITINGS (Graham Bird ed., 1995); THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY (John J. McDermott ed., 1981).  
 53.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER ON-LINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/pragmatic (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) (noting pragmatic relates “to matters 
of fact or practical affairs often to the exclusion of intellectual or artistic matters”). 
 54.  But see NOLAN, supra note 4, at 144 (“One rightly questions whether to be pragmatic is 
to eschew philosophy or theory.  Recall Richard Posner’s assertion . . . that legal pragmatism is, in 
fact, a theory.”). 
 55.  Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1610. 
 56.  See Boldt, supra note 34, at 1250–52 (“[W]hen treatment is built into a system that has 
retained at least some of the features of traditional criminal law blaming practices, such as the 
power to use coercive measures, procedural informality and a lack of detachment on the part of 
the decision maker can result in severe negative consequences for the defendant . . . .”); see also 
Casey, supra note 41, at 1495–1502 (problem-solving courts are “not fair” and “not neutral”); 
Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway?  Musings of a Public Defender About Drug Treat-
ment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 68–69 (2000) (drawing upon the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and highlighting the importance of defense counsel presence at 
drug court status hearings). 
 57.  See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Retributivism, Proportionality, and the Challenge of the Drug 
Court Movement, in RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST: HAS IT A FUTURE? 214, 214–29 (Michael Ton-
ry ed., 2011). 
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reducing recidivism, linking offenders to treatment, safeguarding the needs 
of crime victims, and the like. 
Inherent in this notion of a trade-off between abstract principle on the 
one hand and instrumental benefit on the other, is a third meaning of prag-
matism.  A practice can be said to be pragmatic in this third sense if its de-
sign and operation are driven primarily by a consideration of outcomes ra-
ther than a preoccupation with the regularity of its process.58  This 
orientation toward consequences rather than process is captured in the em-
phasis problem-solving courts place on doing what works.  Thus, the Center 
for Court Innovation, in its Principles of Problem-Solving Justice, con-
cludes in just these terms that “the broad spectrum of problem-solving jus-
tice initiatives share a common outlook, an outlook that, at its heart, empha-
sizes outcomes over process.”59 
Legal and philosophical pragmatism share many of the features associ-
ated with conventional, ordinary-language notions of pragmatism, given 
their focus on the consequences of practice.  They are also, however, theo-
retical perspectives that offer some purchase on the normative dimensions 
of law and other social undertakings.60  While pragmatist theory contests 
the possibility of objective truth claims asserted outside of a particular con-
text, it also contemplates that guiding generalizations or principles can be 
derived from the data of experience, and insists that these principles should 
be employed to shape and direct future practice.61  Pragmatism thus is 
committed to the proposition that theory necessarily is embedded in prac-
tice and becomes most meaningful when it is directed systematically to the 
solving of problems.62 
                                                          
 58.  See NOLAN, supra note 4, at 36 (“Among the common themes emphasized by legal 
pragmatists are a result-oriented preoccupation with ‘what works’ . . . .”). 
 59.  WOLF, supra note 5, at 9. 
 60.  See NOLAN, supra note 4, at 36 (stating “[t]hough perhaps unaware of academic theoriz-
ing by legal and philosophical pragmatists, U.S. problem-solving court practitioners often act in a 
manner commensurate with these themes”); see also Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragma-
tism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 790 (1989) (noting that “neo-pragmatists seek a bridge across the di-
vide that has separated Anglo-American from European philosophy”; the divide may be best un-
derstood as an enterprise employing, on the one hand, the “scientific method” and, on the other 
hand, an enterprise seeking meaning through “the exploration of culture and lived experience”); 
Posner, supra note 35, at 1662 (“The pragmatic outlook can help us maintain a properly critical 
stance toward mysterious entities that seem to play a large role in many areas of law, particularly 
tort and criminal law.”).  
 61.  See Boldt, supra note 35, at 45–46 (explaining that pragmatism involves principles to 
guide action that are both empirical and abstract); Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1628 
(“[T]he contextualist uses categories to select which particular details matter.  Those categories 
can be generalized.”). 
 62.  See Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1610 (explaining that pragmatists apply practi-
cal thinking to solve problems). 
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The theoretical insights of legal and philosophical pragmatism are of 
significant potential value to the practical problem-solving activities under-
taken by drug treatment courts and other specialty courts precisely because 
the “problems” addressed by these legal actors are not fixed or intrinsic, but 
instead are negotiated social phenomena.63  Work on the micro-politics of 
trouble suggests that the very interventions designed to resolve or amelio-
rate problems also function to define and organize participants’ understand-
ing of what the relevant trouble is.64  An atheoretical approach to problem-
solving is likely to be inattentive to the range of choices associated with the 
identification of relevant problems and acceptable solutions.  Pragmatist 
theory provides valuable insights that have the potential to improve this 
field of practice by highlighting and informing choices that might otherwise 
remain below the conscious attention of participants.  This greater inten-
tionality goes to the selection of what outcome data to evaluate for purposes 
of shaping future practice, and to the construction of categories by which 
that data is organized and comprehended.65 
II.  PRAGMATIST THEORY AND ITS CRITIQUE 
Over two decades ago, Thomas Grey observed that “[p]ragmatism is 
freedom from theory-guilt.”66  Grey’s point was not that theory is unim-
portant; indeed, he and other leading proponents of legal and philosophical 
pragmatism have engaged theory energetically.67  Pragmatist theorizing, 
however, involves more than the rational manipulation of abstract proposi-
tions.  It also attends to the development, evolution, and fitting together of 
those propositions in light of continuing experience.  It is an empirical, con-
sequential practice.68 
                                                          
 63.  See Emerson & Messinger, supra note 36, at 128 (“It is important to understand how out-
side intervention radically transforms what were previously private troubles, for this transfor-
mation shows most clearly the negotiated (rather than intrinsic) nature of problems.  Whereas dis-
agreements about the nature of the trouble and how to remedy it were previously confined to (and 
under the control of) the initial parties, the involvement of a third party reconstitutes the trouble as 
a distinctly public phenomenon.”). 
 64.  See id. (stating that the participant learns the nature of his problem because “[t]aking a 
problem to an outside party may provide the first occasion for seeing the trouble as a coherent 
whole and formulating an explicit history of the trouble”). 
 65.  See Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1629 (“[O]nce the pretended distinction be-
tween context and abstraction is discarded, the important question becomes which context should 
matter, what traits or aspects of the particular should be addressed, how wide should the net be 
cast in colle[c]ting the details, and what scale should be used to weigh them?”). 
 66.  Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theory, 63 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1569 (1990).   
 67.  See supra note 35. 
 68.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 75–76 (2003) (stating 
“legal pragmatism is empirical in its orientation” and that “[t]he important thing [for pragmatism] 
is to get a sense of the factual consequences”); Grey, supra note 66, at 1569 (“To the pragmatist, 
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The term “pragmatism” was first used in a formal academic setting by 
William James, in a lecture he gave at Berkeley in 1898, entitled “Philo-
sophical Conceptions and Practical Results.”69  James attributed the “prin-
ciple of pragmatism” to Charles Sanders Peirce, with whom he had worked 
years earlier while a student at Harvard.70  He summarized the principle in 
the following terms: “The ultimate test for us of what a truth means is in-
deed the conduct it dictates or inspires . . . [t]he effective meaning of any 
philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular 
consequence, in our future practical experience . . . .”71  Essentially, 
James’s project was to reconfigure the criteria for evaluating a truth claim 
so that the test would not be the “rational self-sufficiency” of an assertion, 
but instead whether it “leads us into more useful relations with the world.”72  
From Peirce and James, this core idea was passed to John Dewey and 
George Mead, and was translated into the legal pragmatism of Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes and the legal realism of Jerome Frank, Karl Llewellyn, and Fe-
lix Cohen.73 
During his lengthy professional life as an academic lawyer and judge, 
Holmes consistently advanced a pragmatist vision that stood in sharp con-
trast to established jurisprudential thinking of the period.74  Under the for-
malist view that predominated in late nineteenth century America, broad ar-
eas of the law (or at least private law) were thought to be governed by an 
underlying system of objective immutable principles that were said to oper-
ate through a process of deductive reasoning to produce concrete results in 
                                                          
theory can be general commentary aimed to teach or reform a practice, or it can be a separate 
practice itself, pursued for its own rewards.  Most often, it will be some mix of the two.”).   
 69.  See generally Louis Menand, Introduction to PRAGMATISM: A READER xiii (Louis Me-
nand ed., 1997) (noting William James defined the “principle of pragmatism” as follows: “To at-
tain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object . . . we need only consider what effects of a con-
ceivably practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and 
what reactions we must prepare.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 70.  Id. at xv (internal quotation marks omitted).  On the background of the “metaphysical 
club” in which James, Peirce, Oliver Wendell Homes, and others participated, see id. at xvi–xvii. 
 71.  Id. at xiii (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72.  Id. at xiv.   
 73.  See Posner, supra note 35, at 1654 (“Parallel to and influenced by the pragmatists, legal 
realism comes on the scene, inspired by the work of Oliver Wendell Ho[lm]es, John Chipman 
Grey, and Benjamin Cardozo and realized in the work of the self-described realists, such as Je-
rome Frank, William Douglas, Karl Llewellyn, Felix Cohen, and Max Radin.”). 
 74.  See Catharine Wells Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition: 
The Pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 NW. U. L. REV. 541, 550–51 (1988) (stating 
that “many legal theorists were troubled ‘that Holmes’ philosophy of law was inconsistent with 
the highest traditions and aspirations of western thought and that his scale of moral and political 
values was badly suited to measure the needs of a progressive and civilized society’”). 
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individual cases.75  From his earliest articles, to his seminal work The 
Common Law,76 to his many judicial opinions, Holmes set out a competing 
perspective captured best, perhaps, in his famous assertion that “[t]he life of 
the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”77 
Holmes’s pragmatist perspective did not mean that legal decision-
makers were at liberty to resolve a dispute however they wished.  The 
common law did operate in Holmes’s view to guide the exercise of judicial 
judgment.  Instead, consistent with the pragmatist thinking of James and 
Dewey, Holmes’s understanding was that the shaping character of common 
law rules was itself the product of a dynamic process grounded in experi-
ence and informed by the concrete circumstances of individual disputes.  In 
this respect, Holmes “meant that what guides the direction of the law, from 
case to case over time, is not immutable reason but changing experience.”78 
A.  John Dewey, Pragmatism, and Moral Judgment 
John Dewey’s pragmatist thought greatly influenced Holmes and the 
early legal realists.79  In 1894, Dewey was appointed chair of the philoso-
phy department at the newly established University of Chicago, where he 
gathered together a remarkable group of pragmatist thinkers.80  A key fea-
ture of their work was the adoption of Charles Darwin’s evolutionary natu-
ralism as a lens through which to view individual human psychology and 
collective social development.  All human activity, including individual 
cognition, was understood by Dewey and his group as continually in a state 
of adjustment to the dynamic social and physical environments in which it 
is situated.  Human nature, in this version of evolutionary naturalism, is 
thus essentially “plastic” and susceptible to the shaping influence of the 
natural and cultural settings within which individuals and groups live.81  
                                                          
 75.  But cf. Menand, supra note 69, at xx (discussing “Holmes’s insight into the insufficiency 
of general principles”).  For a good description and critique of legal formalism, see JEROME 
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1949).  
 76.  OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Little, Brown & Co. 1881). 
 77.  Id. at 1. 
 78.  Menand, supra note 69, at xxi.   
 79.  See id. at xxii (“The one self-proclaimed pragmatist whose writings Holmes admired . . . 
was John Dewey.”). 
 80.  See Boldt, supra note 35, at 25 (“In rapid succession, he secured faculty appointments for 
George Herbert Mead, James Rowland Angell, A.W. Moore, and Edward Scribner Ames.  Collec-
tively, these pragmatist thinkers and others who joined them over time became known as the Chi-
cago School of American philosophy.”). 
 81.  See id. at 25–26 (“Dewey and his followers regarded humans as part of a larger natural 
environment that included all of the other animals, and that was characterized by a continuous 
process of evolution.  In this respect, they believed that all human activity, including cognition, 
had to be understood in dynamic terms.  Human psychology, in this account, was always chang-
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Moreover, Dewey and his colleagues argued that individuals encounter 
these environments not in isolation, but as social actors.82  Thus, the evolu-
tionary process they described necessarily is built up out of the experiences 
that occur in the context of schools, families, workplaces, community asso-
ciations, and the like.83  For Dewey, the education theorist, this belief in the 
essential plasticity and intrinsic sociability of human beings was central to 
the program of teaching and learning that he espoused throughout his aca-
demic career.84  For Dewey, the social theorist, it energized a deep com-
mitment to the development of pluralist democratic institutions within 
which healthy human development could take place.85 
If evolutionary naturalism informed Dewey’s “theory of education” 
and his “theory of politics,” it was also consistent with his “theory of 
knowledge,” which he shared in most respects with Peirce and James.86  
Dewey believed that Enlightenment liberalism had been founded on a false 
distinction between knowing and doing.87  In the place of this distinction 
(and a host of allied dichotomies, including the distinctions between utility 
and aesthetics, objective fact and subjective experience, means and ends), 
Dewey urged a monist methodology in which the truth of a proposition was 
to be figured not by its objective correspondence to a priori principles but 
by its ability to advance the interests of a relevant community of persons.88 
Although Dewey’s voluminous writings on education theory, politics, 
and philosophy garnered considerable attention and drew a fair amount of 
                                                          
ing, constantly adjusting to the forces of an environment that itself was the site of flux and 
change.”). 
 82.  Id. at 28 (noting that even “the pragmatists’ philosophy of education stressed collective 
and engaged social action” and “urged instead a process of ‘learning by doing’ designed to ‘instill 
a sense of collective social responsibility” (footnotes omitted)). 
 83.  See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING EDUCATION 14 (1903) (stat-
ing that “[t]he only way to prepare for social life is to engage in social life”).  See generally Me-
nand, supra note 69, at xxiv (explaining how both Dewey and Holmes conceptualized “experi-
ence” in the same way: “as a name for culture”). 
 84.  See JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 2–3 (1922) (discussing the renewal and re-creation of beliefs 
through the operation of social groups); see also Menand, supra note 69, at xxiv (“‘The non-social 
individual,’ [Dewey] wrote in one of his earliest essays, ‘is an abstraction arrived at by imagining 
what man would be if all his human qualities were taken away.’”). 
 85.  See ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 436 (1991) 
(emphasizing the importance Dewey placed on equality as a “democratic distribution of liber-
ties”). 
 86.  Menand, supra note 69, at xxiii. 
 87.  See Boldt, supra note 35, at 28 (noting that Dewey and his colleagues collapsed the cate-
gories of thinking and doing). 
 88.  See id. at 26–27 (“Instead of employing a priori ethical principles or precepts to evaluate 
human behavior, they urged ethical evaluation based upon experience and utility.”). 
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supportive and critical commentary throughout his active career,89 perhaps 
the most spirited and illuminating exchanges took place in the mid-1930s, 
when Dewey, by then at Columbia University, became locked in a vigorous 
debate with Robert Maynard Hutchins, a former Yale Law School professor 
who had become President of the University of Chicago.90  Their dispute 
was framed in terms of education theory, but the heart of the controversy 
centered on Dewey’s scientific naturalism and the contextual experimental-
ist approach to knowledge that was at the foundation of his pragmatist pro-
ject.  Hutchins’s approach was based on a rational humanism whose prem-
ises were deeply inconsistent with those adopted by Dewey.91 
Where Dewey assumed that human nature was plastic and subject to 
the shaping influences of culture and the social environment, Hutchins as-
serted that “‘[t]he nature of man, which is the same everywhere, is obscured 
but not obliterated by the differing conventions of different cultures.’”92  
Where Dewey posited that human beings are, like all the animals, part of a 
broader natural environment and thus subject to an ongoing process of dy-
namic evolution, Hutchins believed that people are fundamentally different 
from the other animals because the capacity for rational thought permits 
men and women to control their environment instead of simply adapting to 
it over time.93  Where Dewey questioned the existence of rational objective 
fact, Hutchins embraced an Aristotelian metaphysics grounded in stable 
first principles.  Where Dewey urged an intellectual practice that is contex-
tual, experimentalist, and utilitarian, Hutchins believed it essential to identi-
                                                          
 89.  For example, Dewey had vigorous exchanges with both Walter Lippmann and Reinhold 
Niebuhr.  EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 156 (1973) (rejecting 
the pragmatism espoused by Dewey, Niebuhr, “[t]ogether with both Hutchins and Lippmann [that] 
symbolized a profound shift in American thought from confidence and optimism in social scien-
tific rationalism to some form of philosophical or religious transcendentalism”). 
 90.  See Boldt, supra note 35, at 29 (“Dewey’s theory of education, and the pragmatist phi-
losophy and politics that supported it, came under direct attack in Robert Hutchins’s 1936 book, 
The Higher Learning in America.”).  For a glimpse into the heart of this debate, see ROBERT 
MAYNARD HUTCHINS, NO FRIENDLY VOICE 39 (1936) (criticizing John Dewey’s views on “‘ab-
stractionism in science as a defect—something unnecessary, but always regrettable’”); John Dew-
ey, Rationality in Education, 3 SOC. FRONTIER 71, 73 (1936) (responding to Hutchins’s 1936 
book); John Dewey, President Hutchins’ Proposals to Remake Higher Education, 3 SOC. 
FRONTIER 103, 104 (1937) [hereinafter Dewey, President Hutchins’ Proposals] (highlighting 
Hutchins’s reliance on Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas, and in turn arguing that “[i]t is astounding 
that anyone should suppose that a return to the conceptions and methods of these writers would do 
for the present situation what they did for the Greek and Medieval eras”).   
 91.  See Boldt, supra note 35, at 31 (describing Hutchins’s belief “that human nature is nei-
ther plastic, as Dewey had taught, nor entirely subject to the constructive force of social context 
and culture”). 
 92.  Id. at 31. 
 93.  Id. at 25–31. 
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fy a priori truths—standards of truth, justice, and goodness—and to engage 
in reasoning (and practice) consistent with those principles.94 
Taken together, these divergent perspectives fueled a sharp disagree-
ment between Dewey and his colleagues on one side and Hutchins and his 
supporters on the other, over “the question of whether moral judgments are 
relative and contingent, as the pragmatists asserted, or subject to fixed eval-
uation according to first principles, as Hutchins believed.”95  Dewey argued 
that any approach that proceeds from objective a priori truths is potentially 
authoritarian because it requires the selection of one particular set of first 
principles to the exclusion of other normative starting points.  For Dewey, 
Hutchins’s Aristotelian perspective was not self-evident or essential, but 
was simply one of many such starting points that one could plausibly se-
lect.96  For his part, Hutchins argued that moral judgment cannot turn simp-
ly on the efficacy of a practice or the utility of its outcomes, but must be 
figured according to some fixed measure of right and wrong.97  He criti-
cized the relativism and contextualism of Dewey’s pragmatist ethics on the 
grounds that a purely instrumental approach renders true moral evaluation 
impossible: “Unless we have the right end before us the means we choose, 
the acts we perform, cannot be right.  We do not praise ingenious murderers 
or clever thieves.”98  Truth, declared Hutchins, is not relative and contin-
gent, but fixed and objective.99 
                                                          
 94.  ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 95 (1936). 
 95.  Boldt, supra note 35, at 34. 
 96.  Id. at 33.  Given the partiality inherent in this approach, the key questions for Dewey be-
came, first, who would be authorized to make the selection of first principles, and second, on what 
basis would that privilege of selection be warranted: 
  There is implicit in every assertion of fixed and eternal first truths the necessity for 
some human authority to decide, in this world of conflicts, just what these truths are 
and how they shall be taught.  This problem is conveniently ignored.  Doubtless much 
may be said for selecting Aristotle and St. Thomas as competent promulgators of first 
truths.  But it took the authority of a powerful ecclesiastic organization to secure their 
wide recognition.  Others may prefer Hegel, or Karl Marx, or even Mussolini as the 
seers of first truths; and there are those who prefer Nazism.   
Dewey, President Hutchins’ Proposals, supra note 90, at 104. 
 97.  See Boldt, supra note 35, at 34 (“‘In order to believe in democracy, then, we must believe 
that there is a difference between truth and falsity, good and bad, right and wrong, and that truth, 
goodness, and rights are objective standards even though they cannot be experimentally verified.’” 
(quoting Robert M. Hutchins, What Shall We Defend? We Are Losing Our Moral Principles, 6 
VITAL SPEECHES, July 1, 1940, at 546)). 
 98.  Id. at 32 (quoting Robert M. Hutchins, Civilization and Politics, U. CHI. MAG., Apr. 
1939, at 8). 
 99.  Robert M. Hutchins, What Shall We Defend?: We Are Losing Our Moral Principles, 6 
VITAL SPEECHES, July 1, 1940, at 548 (“[W]e must believe that there is such a thing as truth and 
that in these matters we can discover it.  . . . [T]here can be no experimental verification of the 
proposition that law, equality, and justice are the essentials of a good state.”). 
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To be sure, Dewey’s experiential and contextual approach to moral 
judgment was at odds with the sort of conventional ethics pursued by 
Hutchins and his allies.  But Deweyan pragmatism was not purely instru-
mental, nor was it inconsistent with an abiding moral and political com-
mitment to fairness, equality, or justice.  In order to ground his pragmatist 
ethics, Dewey distinguished between “ends-in-themselves” and “end[s]-in-
view.”100  The process of “determining the true good cannot be done once 
for all,” he explained, but must “be done, and done over and over and over 
again, in terms of the conditions of concrete situations as they arise.”101  In 
these terms, Dewey envisioned the practice of moral decisionmaking as an 
ongoing enterprise in which any firm distinction between means and ends is 
always provisional.  Thus, when faced with a consequential choice, a prag-
matist decisionmaker should proceed on the basis of a plan developed to 
accomplish an identified end-in-view.  Upon completion of the plan, ex-
plained Dewey, effective moral judgment requires that the consequences of 
the choice be examined and the end-in-view revised accordingly, so that the 
next plan developed for the next moment of decision might reflect the learn-
ing derived from prior relevant experience.102 
Importantly, the system of reflection, assessment, and revision con-
templated by Dewey was not devoid of “generalized ideas” or governing 
principles, as Hutchins had suggested.103  Indeed, Dewey urged the consid-
eration of generalized principles as “intellectual instrumentalities in judg-
ment of particular cases,” although these guiding ideas were to be derived 
not from a priori first principles, but from experience itself.104  As a product 
of the sum of the many prior acts of decision and assessment envisioned by 
Deweyan pragmatism, these guiding principles likely would have the sort of 
abstract quality characteristic of Aristotelian first principles.  They were not 
to be treated as fixed or immutable, however, but instead as revisable con-
tingent guides to moral evaluation undertaken for now and in context.105 
                                                          
 100.  JOHN DEWEY, 2 THEORY OF VALUATION, INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA UNIFIED SCI. 40 (1939). 
 101.  JOHN DEWEY, Ends, the Good and Wisdom, in 7 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 
1925–1953, at 184, 212 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1985). 
 102.  See Boldt, supra note 35, at 45. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  DEWEY, supra note 100, at 44. 
 105.  Dewey captured this set of ideas about social practice, moral evaluation, and law in the 
following metaphor of a river flowing within and also slowly altering its banks: 
We may use the analogy, or if one prefers, the metaphor, of a river valley, a stream, and 
banks.  The valley in its relation to surrounding country, or as the ‘lie of the land’, is the 
primary fact.  The stream may be compared to the social process, and its various waves, 
wavelets, eddies, etc., to the special acts which make up a social process.  The banks are 
stable, enduring conditions, which limit and also direct the course taken by the stream, 
comparable to customs.  But the permanence and fixity of the banks, as compared with 
the elements of the passing stream, is relative, not absolute. Given the lie of the land, 
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B. The Contemporary Debate 
Richard Posner has observed that pragmatism is not so much a 
“school” as it is “an umbrella term for diverse tendencies in philosophical 
thought.”106  Posner points out that there were important differences be-
tween the specific approaches set out by Peirce, James, and Dewey, and a 
similar range of variation is apparent in the work of more recent pragma-
tists, including Richard Rorty, Cornel West, and Stanley Fish, and among 
legal pragmatists such as Martha Minow, Thomas Grey, Daniel Farber, and 
others.107  Nevertheless, Posner identifies “three ‘essential’ elements” that 
tend to characterize the work of all these writers and that link the thinking 
of earlier pragmatist theorists together with those whose work is more re-
cent.  The first element is an anti-essentialism or “distrust of metaphysical 
entities (‘reality,’ ‘truth,’ ‘nature,’ etc.) viewed as warrants for certitude 
whether in epistemology, ethics, or politics.”108  The second is an emphasis 
on the consequentiality of ideas: “an insistence that propositions be tested 
by their consequences.”109  The third is a commitment to evaluating under-
takings, including scientific, ethical, political, or legal practices, by refer-
ence “to social or other human needs rather than to ‘objective,’ ‘impersonal’ 
criteria.”110  Taken together, says Posner, these features tend to make prag-
matic work forward-looking, “experimental,” and “commonsensical.”111 
Because more recent versions of legal and philosophical pragmatism 
share these “essential” features with an earlier generation of pragmatists, it 
should come as little surprise that contemporary legal and philosophical 
pragmatists have been subject to a form of criticism not unlike that directed 
by Robert Hutchins against the work of John Dewey.112  Martha Minow and 
Elizabeth Spelman have described one version of this critique, and have of-
fered a useful response to it.  The basic concern of the critics, they explain, 
is that pragmatists will become “incapacitat[ed] . . . as moral and political 
critics.”113  This risk is said to derive from two related features inherent in 
                                                          
the stream is an energy which carves its way from higher to lower levels and thereby, 
when viewed as a long run (in time as well as in space) process, it forms and reforms its 
own banks. 
John Dewey, My Philosophy of Law, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN 
AMERICAN SCHOLARS 73, 78–79 (Julius Rosenthal Found. ed., 1941). 
 106.  Posner, supra note 35, at 1653, 1660.   
 107.  Id. at 1654. 
 108.  Id. at 1660.   
 109.  Id.  
 110.  Id. at 1660–61. 
 111.  Id. at 1661. 
 112.  Thomas Grey characterizes critics as suggesting that pragmatism is deficient because it 
does not have a “practice-independent evaluative theory.”  Grey, supra note 66, at 1591. 
 113.  Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1616.  
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pragmatist thought.  First, the rejection of a priori normative foundations—
pragmatism’s anti-foundationalism—yields a kind of moral and political 
relativism incapable of grounding judgments.  Second, pragmatism’s thor-
oughgoing contextualism—its heightened attention to the contingencies of 
any moment of decision—undermines the “possibility of criticism across 
situations, persons, and cultures.”114 
The moral relativism argument is consonant with Hutchins’s critique 
from the 1930s.  As Minow and Spelman put it, “if a particular moral or po-
litical dilemma can be understood and evaluated only in light of the specific 
details of the circumstances, then we risk abandoning or refusing to 
acknowledge foundations for moral and political judgment that endure 
through time.”115  In the absence of any such normative grounding, critics 
argue that decisionmaking can neither be stable over time nor insulated 
from the moral distortions of unequal social, economic, or political power.  
Pragmatic approaches, they claim, “seem to deny the possibility of trust-
worthy and legitimate foundations for the exercise of judgment and thereby 
leave power and politics standing bare.”116 
The second prong of the critique described by Minow and Spelman is 
that pragmatist theory is so particularistic that it inhibits the development of 
abstract thinking necessary for systematic judgment.117  Pragmatism’s call 
for the primacy of context, according to this view, undermines the capacity 
of the decisionmaker to see the forest instead of the trees.118  This over-
individualization critique focuses on pragmatism’s anti-essentialism, its 
“emphasis on the uniqueness of persons and events and thus on the im-
portance of the differences among them.”119 
Such an emphasis on the particular characteristics of an individual ac-
tor and the circumstances of his or her conduct is said to inhibit the attribu-
tion of moral responsibility because moral judgment is, by definition, com-
                                                          
 114.  Id.   
 115.  Id. at 1617.  These enduring foundations that are held to be necessary for supporting a 
coherent process of normative evaluation can derive from a variety of sources.  Foundational prin-
ciples may be identified by reference to some divine authority or conception of nature.  Id. at 
1619.  Alternatively, human-created devices “for transcending subjectivity and power,” id., such 
as Rawls’s “original position,” JOHN RAWLS: A THEORY OF JUSTICE 18 (1971), may be adopted 
as the basis for figuring foundational principles.  Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1619.  Al-
ternatively, customary devices such as commercial markets or common law courts could be relied 
upon to generate persisting bases for moral judgment.  Id. 
 116.  Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1617.  Under such circumstances “knowledge and 
judgment reflect mere power and politics; the results risk not merely intellectual chaos and inco-
herence, but also social and political disorder and violence.”  Id. at 1618. 
 117.  See id. at 1621–22 (“But, the objection might go, one cannot emphasize contextual de-
tails without undermining the importance of commonality of persons and events.”). 
 118.  Id. at 1622. 
 119.  Id. at 1621. 
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parative.  On this understanding, moral evaluation necessarily involves the 
application of fixed standards to a class of actions or events that are similar 
in terms that are relevant to the moral calculation.  A radically contextual-
ized assessment of conduct, by contrast, resists the process of abstraction by 
which an individual event is held to be sufficiently similar to other events to 
be judged according to some common standard of right and wrong.  Atten-
tion to the details that render an individual event distinct or an individual 
actor unique may be helpful as a descriptive matter in coming to understand 
why the event occurred as it did or why the actor behaved as he or she did, 
but it is inconsistent with the collective project of maintaining a coherent 
normative universe.120 
According to Minow and Spelman: 
 If terms of moral and political approbation are not to be seen 
simply as complicated ways of saying “I like that” or “I don’t like 
that,” i.e., if what we say has any normative status at all, then we 
are invoking a standard against which a person or an act is meas-
ured, a standard that may in principle be appropriately invoked in 
other relevantly similar situations.121 
Minow and Spelman respond to these concerns about pragmatism’s 
anti-foundationalism and contextualism, which converge in the claim that 
pragmatist methods “disable judgment and produce dangerous relativism,” 
by arguing that this critique is based on a false “binary distinction between 
                                                          
 120.  Id. at 1624.  In such a universe, like cases are not only treated alike, each set of like cases 
is also resolved by means that are carefully worked through as serving ends that have received 
considerable detached thought. Cf. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE: AND OTHER 
COP-OUTS, SOB STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 3–7 (1994) (asserting that permit-
ting criminal defendants to use a history of abuse as an excuse for committing certain crimes may 
explain that individual’s behavior but takes away the responsibilities held by people as a whole). 
 121.  Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1624.  An alternative version of the over-
individualization critique rests not on the difficulty of making moral judgments but on the inherent 
conservatism of the pragmatist methodology.  David Luban, for example, has argued that pragma-
tism tends to foster a kind of “[c]onceptual conservatism,” precisely because its attention to con-
text encourages a narrow framing of the problems for which solutions are sought.  See DAVID 
LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 137 (1994).  By definition, a highly particularistic analysis is local 
rather than general.  Id.  It presses focus on the distinctive features of the people and circumstanc-
es being addressed, and diminishes the saliency of characteristics that are shared with others 
caught up in the broader dynamics described by, for example, race, ethnicity, class, gender, or 
sexual orientation.  See Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1622–23.  On these terms, the adop-
tion of a pragmatist approach is likely to dampen efforts to identify and change broad but prob-
lematic institutional or cultural structures in society.  LUBAN, supra, at 137–38.  Thinking contex-
tually, it is argued, narrows the set of social, cultural, and political data that are in play, and 
requires that we hold constant most of the conditions that constitute the context or frame for anal-
ysis.  Id.  Thus, a methodology that is local and contextual, by definition, requires that “[a]t any 
time we must withhold the overwhelming preponderance of our beliefs and concepts from critical 
scrutiny; and whenever we revise our beliefs, we must revise them minimally.”  Id. at 138. 
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abstraction and context.”122  In their view, pragmatist thinking involves 
“constant interactions between” abstraction and context.123  Our environ-
ments are too rich with data to permit our encountering them without the 
organizing heuristics by which we categorize and, ultimately, simplify our 
understanding of our circumstances.124  All thought, including theoretical 
analysis, requires the framing provided by context.125 
If moral judgment involves the comparative application of normative 
principles to an actor or event within a class of similar actors or events, 
some set of organizing ideas must be available to construct the relevant cat-
egory of comparables.  Moreover, we come to each new moment of deci-
sion shaped by our individual and group histories.  We encounter concrete 
environments through lenses calibrated and sharpened by our accumulated 
experiences.126  A decisionmaker must determine what subset of details 
within the larger universe of available information to treat as immediately 
relevant to his decision.127  This choice of context is not self-evident, it de-
pends upon the decisionmaker’s perspective, his broader view of the world 
as informed by generalized principles.  Pragmatist theory assists the deci-
sionmaker by elucidating the partiality of his perspective.  It guides the 
making of decisions about what details to attend to, how the “problem” 
should be framed, and how “solutions” to that problem should be described. 
C. Pragmatism and Perspective 
As an example, imagine that a state’s chief judicial officer wishes to 
employ a careful form of pragmatist analysis to evaluate the state’s special-
ized drug treatment courts for the purpose of determining whether to devote 
more resources to these courts.  The evaluation no doubt will be focused, as 
such evaluations most often are, on objective outcome measures, including 
                                                          
 122.  Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1625. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 1629; see also Daan Braveman, A Cubist Vision of Legal Education, 43 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 997, 1022 (1992) (recognizing that categorization occurs but stressing “that the use of 
categories is not the problem,” rather “the problem is the lack of desire to examine the categoriza-
tions that are made”). 
 125.  See Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1627–28 (“Arguments and principles presented 
as if they came from no situation still sit within the contexts of their authors and readers; the ab-
sence of overt clues that those contexts exist does not eliminate them or overcome the inevitable 
limitations of their circumstances.”).  
 126.  See id. at 1628 (“[W]e are embodied, historical beings, we are limited by our partial 
view.”); see also Braveman, supra note 124, at 1021–22 (emphasizing the importance of “multiple 
perspectives” when categorizing and breaking down complicated issues). 
 127.  See Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1605 (“[W]e are always in some context, as are 
the texts that we read, their authors and readers, our problems, and our efforts to achieve solutions.  
Typically, therefore, when people advocate looking or deciding ‘in context,’ they advocate a 
switch from one context to another—from one level of analysis to another, or from a focus on one 
set of traits or concerns to a focus on another set.”).   
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participants’ criminal recidivism rates, rates of relapse into active drug or 
alcohol misuse, and the like.128  If the analysis is rigorous, these outcome 
data will be developed both for participants and for a control group of of-
fenders who share the same or similar relevant characteristics as partici-
pants.129 
Assuming the data developed in our hypothetical state evaluation are 
similar to those gathered in a number of other states, they likely will reveal 
the following: first, a significant subset of the defendants who participate in 
the drug treatment court process fail to complete the program; second, the 
criminal re-arrest and re-conviction rates and drug abuse relapse rates of 
those participants who do complete the program are somewhat lower than 
those of the comparison group, at least in the first year or so following 
graduation; and third, the outcome measures for the cohort of defendants 
who fail in the drug treatment court are likely to be as bad or worse than 
those for the comparison group of defendants processed through the ordi-
nary criminal justice system.130 
What conclusions will the careful pragmatist chief judicial officer 
draw from these statistics?  If, on one hand, she takes as the most relevant 
group for analysis those participants who manage to complete the drug 
treatment court regime, the conclusion will be a happy one.  Viewed in this 
context, drug courts work.131  Some number of criminal offenders whose 
problems with chronic substance misuse likely would have pushed them 
back through the revolving door of the criminal justice system had they not 
been intercepted by the specialized treatment court will now manage to stay 
clear of the police and the courts.132  Framed in this fashion, the evaluation 
might seek to identify the costs of the intensive treatment-based interven-
tions provided by the drug treatment court for these defendants, and then 
compare those costs to the considerable savings produced by the lower 
                                                          
 128.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-219, ADULT DRUG COURTS: 
EVIDENCE INDICATES RECIDIVISM REDUCTIONS AND MIXED RESULTS FOR OTHER OUTCOMES 1–
2 (2005) (assessing recidivism rates, substance use relapse, and program completion rates of par-
ticipants of adult drug court programs); cf. AMANDA B. CISSNER & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., CTR. 
FOR CT. INNOVATION, AVOIDING FAILURES OF IMPLEMENTATION: LESSONS FROM PROCESS 
EVALUATIONS 2 (2009) (examining criminal justice experiments undertaken by the Center for 
Court Innovation and the U.S. Department of Justice). 
 129.  In the best of all circumstances (which are exceedingly rare in this field), the study will 
be “double blind.”  See Boldt, supra note 50, at 51–52 (discussing the problem of selection bias in 
studies on the effectiveness of drug courts). 
 130.  Id. at 50–57. 
 131.  See Douglas B. Marlowe, The Verdict on Adult Drug Courts, ADVOCATE, Sept. 2008, at 
14, 15 (“[Results of research on drug courts] conﬁrm beyond a reasonable doubt that drug courts 
signiﬁcantly reduce crime and save communities considerable money.”). 
 132.  Id. at 14–15. 
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crime rates and reduced substance misuse exhibited by the court’s gradu-
ates.133 
If, on the other hand, the pragmatist chief judicial officer’s context is 
described primarily by the group of drug treatment court participants who 
fail to complete the program, her attention will be directed to a very differ-
ent set of data.  The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers re-
ports that “[t]he sentences in many courts are significantly higher for those 
who seek drug treatment and fail than for those who simply avoid drug 
treatment and take a plea, at both the misdemeanor and felony level.”134  
The costs associated with these increased criminal sentences are borne, of 
course, by the corrections system, but also by the affected offenders and 
their families and communities.135  In addition, a focus on those who fail 
likely would lead the pragmatist decisionmaker to consider the costs to sys-
tem legitimacy incurred as a result of the diminished procedural safeguards 
and broad procedural informality that characterize the sentencing decisions 
of drug treatment court judges.136  This relaxed procedural stance may be 
relatively benign in those instances in which participants graduate and 
thereby avoid further criminal punishment, but it produces a corrosive ef-
fect in the class of cases in which participants fail at treatment and are sub-
jected to augmented punishment ordered by a decisionmaker whose capaci-
ty for formal fairness has been compromised by problem-solving 
informality.137 
                                                          
 133.  See, e.g., Michael Rempel et al., Multi-Site Evaluation Demonstrates Effectiveness of 
Adult Drug Courts, 95 JUDICATURE 154, 156 (2012) (“We estimate that the benefits of drug court 
outweigh the costs: on average, drug courts save $5,680 to $6,208 per participant.”). 
 134.  NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, AMERICA’S PROBLEM-SOLVING 
COURTS: THE CRIMINAL COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM 29 (2009). 
 135.  See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African 
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1281 (2004) (“[A] central focus of this research 
is community members other than inmates, including family members, friends, and neighbors of 
prisoners who suffer adverse consequences that flow beyond the prison gates.”). 
 136.  Casey, supra note 41, at 1483. 
 137.  See id. (discussing the judge’s discretion in sentencing decisions as impacted by “a sub-
jective impression that the defendant [who failed out of drug treatment] is not putting forth suffi-
cient effort”).  In thinking about the tasks of legal judgment required of judges, Catharine Wells 
has drawn a useful distinction between the first-order activities that are the subject of legal deci-
sionmaking and the second-order activity of judging itself.  Catharine Wells, Situated Deci-
sionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727, 1729 (1990).  Wells argues that judges properly ought to 
assume the role of agents (active participants) when engaging in the second-order activity of judi-
cial decisionmaking, but should avoid surrendering their status as spectators (disengaged neutrals) 
when it comes to the underlying events that are the subject of the judicial proceedings.  Id.  
Wells’s endorsement of second-order agency is consistent with her larger project of developing a 
theory of “situated decisionmaking” for judges, but the sort of active engagement she has in mind 
does not include judicial participation in first-order activities such as the provision of therapeutic 
services assumed by many problem-solving court judges and contemplated by the problem-
solving court model.  Id.  Once the problem-solving court judge adopts an agent’s stance with re-
spect to first-order activities, deep problems of fairness and legitimacy emerge when the status of 
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The choice between these competing contexts is not taken in a vacu-
um.  It is governed by perspective, by the generalized understandings (con-
scious or not) that the decisionmaker brings to the analysis.  These general-
ized understandings not only drive the selection of the relevant context, 
they also help to shape the pragmatist’s conception of the “problem” to be 
addressed by these specialized problem-solving courts.  To oversimplify, 
the chief judicial officer might view the problem to be that the criminal jus-
tice system is overtaxed by a large population of offenders whose criminal 
offending is exacerbated by drug use disorders and other co-occurring men-
tal disabilities.138  From this perspective, these offenders are surely blame-
worthy (they have, after all, committed criminal offenses), but the commu-
nity will nonetheless be better off if the criminal justice system overload 
they are producing can be addressed by therapeutic responses designed to 
ameliorate some of their underlying pathologies.139  Viewed from an alter-
native perspective, the problem might be that a significant number of oth-
erwise non-blameworthy individuals have become enmeshed in the criminal 
justice system because their drug use disorders or other mental disabilities 
have brought them to the attention of a law enforcement system made over-
vigilant by the “war on drugs.”140  From this point of view, the goal of de-
veloping effective therapeutic interventions is to rescue these individuals 
from an inherently punitive system in which they do not belong.141 
Finally, one could imagine a perspective that represents a mix of these 
polar positions.  Perhaps our pragmatist decisionmaker believes that, of the 
many offenders in the criminal system who suffer from drug use disorders, 
                                                          
an offender shifts from that of a participant to that of an offender who has failed the program.  Id.  
That shift is associated with a corresponding shift in the stance of the problem-solving court judge 
from first-order agent to second-order decisionmaker.  See Casey, supra note 41, at 1483 (“Th[e] 
moment of failure is also where the judge exercises the most discretion . . . .  The decision of the 
court that the defendant did not complete the treatment program is based not on a legal standard, 
but on a clinical standard, or perhaps on a subjective impression . . . .”).  Unfortunately, the 
judge’s previous involvement as a first-order agent is in tension with the basic model of judicial 
integrity that is at the heart of his or her obligations as a second-order legal decisionmaker, and 
thereby destabilizes the architecture upon which the system’s legitimacy rests.  Wells, supra, at 
1729. 
 138.  For a nuanced analysis of the relationship between drugs and crime, see Candido da 
Agra, The Complex Structures, Processes and Meanings of the Drug/Crime Relationship, in 
DRUGS AND CRIME DEVIANT PATHWAYS 9, 9–30 (Serge Brochu et al. eds., 2002).  
 139.  See Berman, supra note 17, at 3 (“Problem-solving courts seek to send the message that 
all criminal behavior should have meaningful consequences.”).  
 140.  See Richard C. Boldt, Drug Policy in Context: Rhetoric and Practice in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. REV. 261, 288–90 (2010) (discussing the central role played 
by the “War on Drugs” in the dramatic increase in the United States prison population). 
 141.  See, e.g., H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Persons with Severe Mental Illness 
in Jails and Prisons: A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 483, 485 (1998) (“[M]any uncared-for 
mentally ill persons may be arrested for minor criminal acts that are really manifestations of their 
illness, their lack of treatment, and the lack of structure in their lives.”). 
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some deserve punishment while others do not.  From this point of view, the 
problem is to separate the “good addicts” from the “bad addicts,” and the 
design and evaluation of drug treatment courts accordingly should proceed 
on that basis.142 
The exercise of judgment necessarily requires that the unruly universe 
of information be organized into conceptual categories, which, in turn, re-
flect the decisionmaker’s perspective.143  In pragmatist theory, perspective 
derives not from fixed a priori axioms, but instead from experience and ob-
servation over time.  It is provisional and contingent, and must be open to 
revision based on the data of ongoing experience.144  This fluid and dynam-
ic quality is at the core of the relativism critique.  Pragmatist perspective 
may not be essential or foundational, but the pragmatist decisionmaker’s 
generalized understandings do help to “guide the mind to a clarifying for-
mulation of the problem” and can serve as the basis for the exercise of nor-
mative judgment.145  Thus, the different conceptions of blameworthiness 
and responsibility embedded in the two polar understandings of the criminal 
offenders described above can be treated not as fixed, inconsistent a priori 
positions, but instead as fluid co-existing possibilities that each govern a 
subset of circumstances and that must be managed together within the oper-
ation of our criminal blaming practices.146 
Attending to a perspective that views defendants in drug treatment 
courts as essentially responsible for their decisions to offend pushes toward 
one set of practices and supports one notion of what counts as programmat-
ic success.  If a significant number of these defendants are able to achieve 
abstinence (and the lower rates of offending associated with it), then the 
relatively more severe (and potentially more unpredictable) punishment 
faced by others who fail the program may be a reasonable practical and 
moral price to pay for that success.  Bringing into focus an alternative per-
spective, however, that views these defendants as caught in a criminal en-
                                                          
 142.  See Stacy Lee Burns & Mark Peyrot, Tough Love: Nurturing and Coercing Responsibil-
ity and Recovery in California Drug Courts, 50 SOC. PROBS. 416, 433 (2003) (“Drug court judges 
try to determine if they are dealing with persons who can be repaired and restored, or with irreme-
diably deficient selves . . . .”). 
 143.  See Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1625 (“[T]he contextualist cannot meaningfully 
talk of context without using categories that simplify, in at least some respects, the particularities 
under examination.”). 
 144.  Id. at 1628 (explaining that proponents of pragmatism derive understanding from context 
as opposed to abstract moral theories). 
 145.  See Grey, supra note 66, at 1589 (noting pragmatist principles “are usually probabilistic 
or defeasible in form rather than universal and axiomatic”). 
 146.  See Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2245, 2295 n.182 (1992) (noting that the subjective experience of free will and the 
objective reality of determinism are both managed within the blaming practices of the criminal 
law). 
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forcement system, ill-suited to their needs or moral status, changes the cal-
culation of acceptable costs and benefits, and supports the adoption of a 
shifted set of practices and procedures.  Pragmatic theory can assist in this 
setting by helping decisionmakers attend to both perspectives within a set of 
practices that hold responsible persons reasonably accountable while also 
insuring individual fairness.147 
This hypothetical example is meant to ground in a particular setting 
the description of pragmatist theory set out earlier.  It provides a link half-
way between the general discussion of pragmatism with which Part II began 
and its application to more concrete data derived from specific problem-
solving courts.  In order to further develop this connection between pragma-
tist theory and problem-solving practice, Part III offers case studies drawn 
from careful field research of two very different kinds of problem-solving 
courts. 
III.  PRAGMATIST THEORY APPLIED 
By design, problem-solving courts vest considerable discretion in the 
judges and other professionals who make crucial decisions with respect to 
the disposition of the criminal offenders subject to their jurisdiction.148  
This highly discretionary practice necessarily is shaped by the perspectives 
these decisionmakers bring to their work. These perspectives frame the de-
cisionmakers’ conception of the “problems” to be addressed and the “solu-
tions” to be sought.149 
                                                          
 147.  For a discussion of the use of harm reduction principles in some problem-solving courts 
see infra text accompanying notes 177–187. 
 148.  See generally Caroline S. Cooper & Joseph A. Trotter, Jr., Recent Developments in Drug 
Case Management: Re-engineering the Judicial Process, 17 JUST. SYS. J. 83, 93–94 (1994) (de-
fining the goals of problem-solving courts “to use judicial authority . . . to directly supervise and 
support the defendant’s performance in treatment and rehabilitation programs”). 
 149.  See Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1598 (stressing the importance of “the context 
in which a problem arose” and the importance of “the context in which someone proposes a re-
sponse to it”).  The pervasiveness of drug-use disorders among criminal offenders and the persis-
tence of criminal justice system overload have both received attention as “problems” to which the 
problem-solving courts movement is directed.  See Berman, supra note 17, at 6.  Each of these 
“problems” has arisen within the context of a “war on drugs” and a broad enforcement-based ap-
proach to drug control that has shaped criminal justice policy in the United States for decades.  
See Boldt, supra note 140, at 285–91 (describing the evolution of drug policy in the United States 
from the 1930s through the “war on drugs,” which has “resulted in a public policy environment 
that has been extremely resistant to other measures that have been effective elsewhere in reducing 
the harms associated with drug misuse”).  The “response” offered by specialized drug treatment 
courts and other problem-solving courts, particularly the decision to deliver drug treatment and 
other human services through the criminal adjudication system, in turn, has been formulated with-
in the context of a pronounced fiscal retrenchment that has simultaneously limited the availability 
of other publicly funded human services resources, Malkin, supra note 19, at 142, and created a 
backlash against the resource-intensive policy of mass incarceration caused by long-standing U.S. 
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Notwithstanding the frequent references to therapeutic jurisprudence 
or restorative justice made by some problem-solving courts advocates, most 
practitioners in these courts have selected a very local or particularistic 
frame of reference for their work.150  This close-to-the-ground approach 
does not render irrelevant the broader perspectives held by these actors, but 
it does potentially move this more abstract thinking out of their field of ac-
tive consciousness.151  Pragmatist theory offers the possibility of opening up 
this field so that the broader organizing principles that are at work shaping 
problem-solving court practice can be brought under active consideration 
and made subject to a process of revision in light of ongoing experience.152 
Thomas Grey has argued that an “intuitive or self-consciously anti-
theoretical pragmatist lawyer[,]” when faced with a challenge to his  prac-
tice framed in terms of top-down theory, “may retreat into defensive and 
rhetorically ineffective irrationalism.”153  Simply grafting a top-down theo-
ry, such as therapeutic jurisprudence, onto an essentially atheoretical prac-
tice is not much of an improvement.  Practical efforts like the problem-
solving courts movement that fail to attend adequately to the development 
of an authentic theoretical perspective “generated by and attached to that 
practice,”154 are at risk of falling subject to the danger identified years ago 
by Robert Hutchins.  The risk is one of becoming incapable of making co-
herent moral or political judgments that persist over reasonably long peri-
ods of time and, within those periods, across cases.155  The designers and 
managers of problem-solving courts need not adopt a top-down theoretical 
model in order to avoid this risk.  The contextual, revisable form of theory 
work envisioned by thoughtful legal and philosophical pragmatism is avail-
able as a method for integrating general principles and practical experience. 
                                                          
drug policy.  See Berman, supra note 17, at 7 (rooting the movement toward problem-solving 
courts in the failure of punitive drug policies). 
 150.  Nolan reports that problem-solving court “practitioners invoke therapeutic jurisprudence 
and restorative justice in varying ways, and often demonstrate only nominal understandings of the 
central tenets of both.”  NOLAN, supra note 4, at 35.  In fact, their efforts more often are directed 
by a “result-oriented preoccupation with ‘what works,’ an experimentalist approach, a skepticism 
toward foundationalist claims, and a forward-looking instrumentalism.”  Id. at 36. 
 151.  See Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1628 (describing how abstract theories relate to 
contextual analysis by guiding the definition of categories, which, in turn, affect the focus of in-
quiry, even if the contextualist is not aware of the influence of these abstract theories). 
 152.  Cf. Braveman, supra note 124, at 1021–23 (discussing the benefits of “[a] Cubist-like 
emphasis on multiple perspectives” and cautioning that “[t]he effort to place a legal problem in a 
single box—the pigeonholing aspect of legal analysis—hides other possible perspectives and im-
pedes development of an understanding of the complexities of the subject”). 
 153.  Grey, supra note 66, at 1590.  Such a challenge has been mounted, for example, by 
Douglas Husak, whose work has employed retributive theory to challenge the core premises of 
drug treatment courts.  Husak, supra note 57, at 215–16. 
 154.  Grey, supra note 66, at 1590. 
 155.  See supra text accompanying notes 98–99. 
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A.  Mental Illness and Homeless Courts 
To explore how the adoption of pragmatist theory can yield useful in-
sights into the design and operation of problem-solving courts, it is helpful 
to consider the example of two mental health/homeless courts in Southern 
California that are described in detail in a recent ethnographic study by Sta-
cy Burns.156  Professor Burns’s careful observational work is part of a 
broader project in which she and a colleague, Mark Peyrot, have been ex-
amining the operation of a number of drug treatment courts and other prob-
lem-solving courts.157  One of the courts discussed by Burns is the “What-
ever it Takes (WIT) Court,” which enrolls “justice-involved mentally ill 
clients/defendants who are also homeless or at significant risk of homeless-
ness.”158  The second is a “‘Homeless Community Court,’” which targets a 
similar population of criminal offenders in a nearby California county.159  
Both of these courts exhibit characteristics that are common generally in 
problem-solving courts.  They are staffed by a collaborative “team,” made 
up of a state court judge, individuals from the probation department, the 
prosecutor’s office, and the public defender’s office, state mental health of-
ficials, and representatives from the treatment community.  The teams meet 
regularly to evaluate candidates for admission, develop individual treatment 
plans, and monitor the progress of clients.  Both courts utilize frequent 
court appearances at which clients’ compliance with program requirements 
is assessed by the judge, and sanctions and rewards, as appropriate, are or-
dered.  And, both follow the “post-plea” approach, under which defendants 
are required to enter a guilty plea in order to undertake the court program.160 
These mental health/homeless courts make available to clients a varie-
ty of services, including mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, 
housing and government benefits assistance, family counseling, employ-
ment counseling, and job training.161  Clients are required to undergo regu-
                                                          
 156.  See Stacy Lee Burns, Mental Health/Homeless Courts: ‘Treating’ Persons with Mental 
Disorders and Co-Occurring Homelessness in the Criminal Justice System (June 12, 2012) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author). 
 157.  See Stacy Lee Burns & Mark Peyrot, Standardizing Social Problems Solutions: The Case 
of Court-Supervised Drug Treatment, in NEW APPROACHES TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS TREATMENT 
205 (Stacy Lee Burns & Mark Peyrot eds., 2010) (tracing the evolution of treatment of drug of-
fenders and comparing different forms of court-supervised drug treatment); see also Stacy Lee 
Burns & Mark Peyrot, Reclaiming Discretion: Judicial Sanctioning Strategy in Court-Supervised 
Drug Treatment, 37 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 720, 720 (2008) (describing the strategies em-
ployed by judges in response to defendant noncompliance in problem-solving courts); Burns & 
Peyrot, supra note 142, at 433–35 (exploring the interactions between drug court judges and de-
fendants that construct the defendant’s personal responsibility for his or her rehabilitation). 
 158.  Burns, supra note 156, at 7. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. at 9. 
 161.  Id. 
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lar drug testing, to participate in mental health and substance abuse treat-
ment, including maintaining medication regimes, and to make regular court 
appearances.162 
A crucial feature of both these courts is their approach to defining a 
participant’s “success” or “failure.”  Like many other therapeutic problem-
solving courts, including drug treatment courts, these courts use a combina-
tion of rewards and sanctions that the judge, guided by the input of others 
on the treatment team,163 determines to be appropriate based upon a client’s 
compliance or noncompliance with the requirements of the program.164  Un-
like many other problem-solving courts, however, the mental 
health/homeless court judges observed by Professor Burns “embrace a wid-
er range of creative responses to client non-compliance.  In practice, these 
mental health courts exhibit a strong preference for reinforcing and encour-
aging client engagement, rather than imposing sanctions.”165  Clients who 
fail to adhere to medication regimes, attend group sessions, or comply with 
other program requirements may receive admonishments, be required to at-
tend additional treatment sessions, or be ordered to return to court more fre-
quently;166 but the judges observed by Burns were notably reluctant to uti-
lize jail sanctions as a response to violations of the program’s rules.167 
In part, this hesitancy to impose punitive measures grows out of an ac-
ceptance on the part of the judges and others associated with these courts 
that the goal of the enterprise is not necessarily to wrestle the clients’ men-
tal illnesses or substance use disorders into permanent remission,168 but in-
stead to reduce to some degree the distress and social dysfunction those 
conditions often produce.169  This more modest “harm reduction ap-
proach”170 no doubt is a concession to the severity and chronicity of the 
                                                          
 162.  Id. 
 163.  In her article, Courting Compliance: Case Managers as “Double Agents” in the Mental 
Health Court, Ursula Castellano offers careful ethnographic data to show how case managers in 
some mental health courts function as “double agents” challenging judges and other criminal jus-
tice actors on mental health court teams to respond in less punitive ways to some noncompliant 
clients while simultaneously working to enforce court rules against the resistance of other partici-
pants.  See Castellano, supra note 45, at 489. 
 164.  Burns, supra note 156, at 5. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. at 21–22. 
 167.  Id. at 13. 
 168.  Id. at 22.  According to Burns, approximately half of the justice-involved persons with 
mental illness in California also have a co-occurring drug or alcohol misuse disorder.  Id.  
 169.  Id. at 18 (“‘Success’ is thus construed realistically, such as the client having achieved 
psychiatric stabilization and housing, or having received the maximum benefit from care.”)  
 170.  Id. at 5. A harm reduction approach defines goals in this area in terms of reduced alcohol 
or other drug misuse, higher social functioning, and reduced offending.  See James L. Nolan, Jr., 
Harm Reduction and the American Difference: Drug Treatment and Problem-Solving Courts in 
Comparative Perspective, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 31, 34–35 (2010) (analyzing the harm 
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mental disabilities from which clients in these courts typically suffer.  For 
individuals who are homeless or nearly homeless and whose adult lives 
have been characterized by a repeating cycle of institutionalization, treat-
ment, and release, followed by decline, decompensation, and re-
institutionalization, a realistic version of success may in fact be limited to 
lengthening the period during which they can live safely in the community, 
maintain stable housing, and engage in productive activity before the next 
relapse occurs.171 
In addition, the tendency of these courts, as compared to the approach 
taken by other problem-solving judges, to respond in a less punitive fashion 
to non-compliance by clients, and to define successful outcomes in more 
modest terms, may reflect a shifted perspective as to the moral status of the 
clients being assessed.  Whereas drug treatment courts and many other 
problem-solving courts retain the dominant criminal justice focus on “as-
sessing individual blame and meting out proportionate punishment,”172 the 
mental health/homeless courts studied by Professor Burns premise judg-
ments about their clients’ performance on an understanding that these indi-
viduals may not be fully responsible agents.173  The defendants in other 
problem-solving courts may struggle with mental illness, alcohol abuse, or 
other drug problems, but the structure of those court processes assumes that 
these individuals are capable of making morally significant choices, either 
to adhere to program requirements or to depart from express rules and clear 
obligations.174  The severely mentally disabled clients in Burns’s mental 
health/homeless courts, by contrast, are understood to be suffering from 
disabilities that impair reasoning and limit their capacity to exercise the sort 
of choice that is essential for full moral agency.  In these terms, the clients 
in these courts are not seen as fully blameworthy, and therefore are exempt-
ed from a good deal of the judgment and punishment normally associated 
with failure in other problem-solving courts. 
                                                          
reduction theory as it pertains to drug and alcohol treatments); see also Gordon Roe, Harm Reduc-
tion as Paradigm: Is Better than Bad Good Enough?, 15 CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 243, 243–48 
(2005) (discussing the harm reduction theory and its origins).  
 171. See Boggs v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 523 N.Y.S. 2d 71, 95 (App. Div. 1987) (Mi-
lonas, J., dissenting).  In Boggs, a New York State judge described this pattern, which he terms 
“revolving door mental health,” in the following fashion: “forcibly institutionalize, forcibly medi-
cate, stabilize, discharge back into the same environment, and then repeat the cycle.”  Id.; see also 
BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 7 (2005) (ana-
lyzing the therapeutic justice model and its effects on chronic patients). 
 172.  Burns, supra note 156, at 6. 
 173.  See id. (emphasizing the “impaired reasoning and choice of clients”). 
 174.  See Burns & Peyrot, supra note 142, at 433 (“By both medicalizing and moralizing the 
problem(s), judges are less interested in particular actions and more so in what the actions reveal 
about the selves under consideration.”). 
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Professor Burns analyzes this feature by paying particular attention to 
the ways in which these mental health/homeless courts “place into context” 
their clients’ performance.175  Burns reports: 
 Rather than blaming the client/defendant in mental 
health/homeless court for problems and/or conflicts with the 
treatment program or personnel, as would be typical in drug 
court . . . a client’s non-compliance in mental health/homeless 
court is often placed in context, with the recognition that the cli-
ent’s reasoning, free will and decision-making are impaired.176 
In essence, the choice to adopt a harm-reduction-based solution to the 
very severe social, medical, and public safety problems presented by clients 
in mental health/homeless courts reflects the framing provided by a distinct 
understanding of their moral agency and autonomy that departs considera-
bly from the more conventional criminal justice perspective regarding 
choice and culpability one ordinarily encounters in other problem-solving 
courts.177  The pragmatist notion that one’s perspective influences the iden-
tification of “problems” and the selection of appropriate “solutions,”178 
then, is clearly on display in the nature of the problem-solving work under-
taken by these courts. 
The resistance to harm reduction in most other problem-solving courts 
in the United States stands in stark contrast to the approach reported by Pro-
fessor Burns in the mental health/homeless courts she studied, and further 
suggests the powerful influence of context and perspective on the design 
and operation of these institutions.  In his book, Legal Accents, Legal Bor-
rowing: The International Problem-Solving Court Movement, James Nolan 
highlights a dramatic “difference between the U.S. and the other countries 
as it concerns the salience of defining treatment philosophies.”179  While 
drug treatment courts and other problem-solving courts in the United States 
maintain a stubborn insistence on “total abstinence,”180 requiring that par-
                                                          
 175.  Burns, supra note 156, at 13. 
 176.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 177.  But cf. E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 519, 541 
(2012).  In this article, Professor Johnston argues that, while “society assumes that an individual’s 
offense reflects his choice to engage in criminal activity . . . [t]he predominant message expressed 
by mental health courts” is that offenders with mental illness “so lack autonomy and moral agency 
that they are inappropriate subjects for the traditional criminal justice system.”  Id. at 540.  Others 
who have studied mental health courts, however, describe a greater ambivalence in many of these 
problem-solving courts with respect to the agency, and thus responsibility, of the mentally ill of-
fenders who are subject to their jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Castellano, supra note 45, at 508–11 (de-
tailing the competing approaches to client non-compliance that coexist in mental health courts). 
 178.  See Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1605 (analyzing how context can change indi-
vidual perspectives). 
 179.  Nolan, supra note 170, at 31. 
 180.  Id. at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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ticipants remain drug- and alcohol-free for a specified period of time in or-
der to “graduate,”181 Nolan reports that problem-solving courts established 
in recent years in Great Britain, Ireland, Canada, and Australia tend to be 
much more flexible in defining success and in accommodating participants’ 
partial compliance with program rules.182  Thus, he quotes an Australian 
drug court magistrate, who explains: “‘We don’t expect participants to be 
totally drug free. . . .  We do tolerate some cannabis use.  And we do toler-
ate some prescription drugs.’”183  He also includes the remarks of Canadian 
commentators who point out that the Toronto court permits participants 
who have suspended the use of more serious drugs and have reduced their 
use of marijuana to move forward in the program, even if they are not relia-
bly and totally abstinent.184  Finally, Nolan shares the story of the develop-
ment in the United Kingdom of “Drug Treatment and Testing Orders” 
(“DTTOs”), which were “[i]nspired by the U.S. drug court model” and 
which served as the forerunners of the drug treatment courts now in opera-
tion in Great Britain.185  Significantly, the performance of the first DTTOs, 
which were tested in pilot programs begun in 1998 in Gloucestershire, Liv-
erpool, and South London, were regarded by British officials as a success 
despite the fact that offenders in these programs “were still using drugs and 
were still participating in criminal activity, albeit at reduced rates.”186  In 
the view of the Home Office, the enterprise was a success because the aver-
age number of crimes committed per month by offenders on DTTOs was 
reduced, as was the amount that participants spent each week on illegal 
drugs.187 
A persistent pejorative moral stance in the United States toward drug 
misuse, and a corresponding drug policy centered almost entirely on crimi-
nal prohibition and enforcement, has led to an approach in which persons 
                                                          
 181.  Id.; see also Peggy Fulton Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the 
Twenty-First Century: The Evolution of the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. 
REV. 717, 761–62 (2008) (discussing the requirement of total abstinence). 
 182.  NOLAN, supra note 4, at 148.  While the focus in text is on participants’ use or misuse of 
drugs and alcohol, a similar approach to harm reduction or harm minimization is reported by No-
lan in other non-U.S. problem-solving courts, including, for example, courts centered on the prob-
lem of prostitution.  See id. at 103 (describing harm reduction philosophy in the prostitution court 
in Melbourne, Australia).  
 183.  See id. at 104 (quoting Libby Wood, magistrate of the Perth drug court). 
 184.  See Nolan, supra note 170, at 45 (quoting Natasha Bakht and Paul Bentley). 
 185.  See id. at 44 (detailing the development of drug treatment and testing orders in Britain).  
For additional discussion of DTTOs, see Boldt, supra note 140, at 324–25 (describing the basic 
features of DTTOs). 
 186.  Nolan, supra note 170, at 44. 
 187.  Id. at 44–45.  For an additional discussion on this issue, see PAUL J. TURNBULL ET AL., 
HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY, DRUG TREATMENT AND TESTING ORDERS: FINAL 
EVALUATION REPORT i (2000) (reporting the reduction in drug use as a result of DTTOs following 
an eighteen-month evaluation in three pilot locations).  
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with drug use disorders “are forced or frightened into treatment programs 
and threatened into abstinence during and after treatment.”188  In the United 
Kingdom, by contrast, “‘[t]he whole harm reduction philosophy has domi-
nated . . . drug policy for a long time”189 because the problem of drug mis-
use has been framed more as a public health problem requiring medical 
management than as a criminal justice problem calling for enforcement, 
blame, and punishment.190 
This sharp divergence of perspectives is especially apparent in the re-
spective approaches of United States and United Kingdom problem-solving 
courts toward the use of pharmacotherapies (especially drug maintenance 
therapies) for the treatment of drug use disorders.  The position of a majori-
ty of U.S. drug treatment courts has been to reject the use of methadone 
maintenance and other drug-maintenance therapies, on the grounds that 
such a pharmacological approach would merely replace one drug of addic-
tion with another, thus frustrating the underlying objective of moving par-
ticipants to abstinence.191  In the problem-solving courts in Great Britain, 
Ireland, Australia, and Canada studied by Nolan, however, methadone 
treatment and other pharmacotherapies are a primary means by which par-
ticipants with drug use disorders are managed.192  To be sure, drug policy in 
all of the western cultures under consideration is informed by an overarch-
ing moral disapproval of drug misuse, but this disapprobation has for many 
years assumed a far more prominent role in driving the formation of public 
policy in the United States than it has in Great Britain and the other coun-
tries that have experimented with problem-solving courts as a response to 
drug and alcohol problems.193  Consequently, the notion that dependence on 
                                                          
 188.  FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG 
CONTROL 11–12 (1992). 
 189.  Nolan, supra note 170, at 44 (quoting Paul Hayes, Chief Probation Officer of the South-
east London Probation Service) (alterations in original). 
 190.  See Boldt, supra note 140, at 262–63 (describing history in the United Kingdom of treat-
ing drug misuse as a medical problem, but noting the partial convergence of British and U.S. poli-
cy in recent years). 
 191.  See Nolan, supra note 170, at 36–37 (stating that use of methadone maintenance in U.S. 
drug treatment courts is “rare”).  Notwithstanding the strong opposition in most problem-solving 
courts to the use of pharmacotherapies to manage participants’ drug addiction, mental health 
courts in general and the mental health/homeless courts studied by Burns in particular place a 
great emphasis on monitoring the participants’ adherence to medication regimes designed to man-
age their chronic mental illnesses.  See Burns, supra note 156, at 5.  Many of these individuals 
also suffer from co-occurring drug and alcohol misuse disorders, and consequently there may 
simultaneously be both an encouragement of pharmacotherapies for mental illness and a resistance 
to chemotherapies for addiction. 
 192.  See Nolan, supra note 170, at 36 (stating that “[a] central treatment practice in many pro-
grams outside of the U.S. is the prescription of a maintenance drug, such as methadone or naltrex-
one”). 
 193.  See Boldt, supra note 140, at 265–91, 309–37 (setting out the divergent moral, legal, and 
political histories of the United States and the United Kingdom with respect to drug policy). 
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a therapeutic maintenance drug might be morally problematic remains co-
herent within the context of the cultural, political, and legal background to-
ward drug misuse that continues to define public policy in the United 
States, while a public health harm-minimization model in place in the Unit-
ed Kingdom and elsewhere makes that sort of moral assessment relatively 
incoherent.194 
The perspective that governs the management of defendants in Burns’s 
mental health/homeless courts has more in common with the point of view 
prevailing in the United Kingdom than with that which predominates in 
most problem-solving courts in the United States.  Not only does this per-
spective support a harm-minimization approach to defining the goals of the 
enterprise generally, it also frames the way in which particular facts about 
the defendants’ performance come to be understood.  Thus, instead of de-
faulting to a presumption that a client’s non-compliance with treatment 
must be due to his or her willful resistance to clear obligations (therefore 
representing a moral failing), these courts are more likely to recognize that 
non-compliance may be the result of a poor fit between the needs of a client 
and the features of the particular treatment program to which he or she had 
been assigned.195  Viewed in this fashion, an understanding of the capacity 
of these courts to “place[] in context”196 participants’ behavior as they seek 
to navigate the problem-solving model—that is, to view that conduct as the 
product of a broad range of factors, some of which are not within their di-
rect control—may help to stimulate the consideration of a reframed model 
for other problem-solving courts as well.197  Under this revised model, the 
tendency to construct participants who fail to adhere to the program as mor-
                                                          
 194.  Nolan summarizes the point as follows:  
As in Scotland, Ireland, Canada, and Australia, methadone maintenance is often a main 
staple of the treatment program associated with England’s drug court and drug court-
like programs.  Such an orientation is attributable in no small measure to Britain’s par-
ticular history of drug control, in which doctors have played a more central role, and 
where providing maintenance drugs for the ‘stable addict’ has been a more common 
practice. 
Nolan, supra note 170, at 39–40.  
 195.  See Burns, supra note 156, at 13–14 (“[C]lient’s non-compliance is attributed to a lack of 
‘fit’ between the client and the particular treatment or treatment provider.”); see also Richard C. 
Boldt, Evaluating Histories of Substance Abuse in Cases Involving the Termination of Parental 
Rights, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 135, 140 (1999) (“What generally goes begging . . . [in 
parental termination cases based upon a parent’s failure at drug treatment] is any meaningful in-
formation about the kind or kinds of ‘treatment’ that were offered, and whether this ‘treatment’ 
was appropriate given the particular characteristics of the parent’s disease.”). 
 196.  Burns, supra note 156, at 13. 
 197.  In assessing the moral agency of defendants in mental health court, it is worth consider-
ing that, even if their problematic behaviors may not be the direct result of their mental illnesses, 
these individuals “may be as blameless for the generation of their criminogenic needs [associated 
with those illnesses] as for their illnesses [considered alone].”  Johnston, supra note 177, at 576. 
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ally deficient is moderated, thereby permitting dispositions for struggling 
clients that avoid more punitive sanctions.198  In addition, the model em-
braces the possibility that intermediate outcomes short of total abstinence or 
permanent remission can be a productive result and not necessarily a fail-
ure, thus moving these courts toward a harm-minimization approach similar 
to that which guides practice in other western countries.199 
Typically, mental health courts in the United States assert two rather 
straightforward premises underlying their efforts to link therapeutic services 
to criminal case management.  The first premise is that there is a direct 
causal relationship between mental illness and criminal conduct.200  The 
second is that the effective treatment of an offender’s underlying mental ill-
ness is likely to prevent his or her future criminality (or at least reduce re-
cidivism).201  As it happens, the association between mental illness and 
criminality is more complex than this account suggests, and, in most cases, 
is not directly causal.202  Researchers studying the question have concluded 
that the group of offenders whose mental disorders can be said to have di-
rectly caused their criminal conduct is actually quite small.203  A second 
                                                          
 198.  See id. at 575–76 (asserting that inviting these offenders to participate in mental health 
courts may serve “to address their criminogenic needs as well as to provide mental health treat-
ment”). 
 199.  See supra text accompanying notes 180–182. 
 200.  See Johnston, supra note 177, at 552 (“At the core of mental health courts is a belief that, 
were it not for eligible offenders’ mental illnesses, these individuals would not have engaged in 
the criminal behavior that prompted their arrest.”). 
 201.  As Johnston explains, most “mental health courts justify segregating and diverting indi-
viduals with certain mental illnesses on the ground that their illnesses likely contributed to their 
criminal behavior[] . . . [and] operate under the assumption that the amelioration of symptoms of 
these mental illnesses will reduce the likelihood of future criminal behavior.”  Id. at 551. 
 202.  See id. at 528 (“Since many mental health courts do not require a demonstrated nexus 
between an individual’s mental illness and his criminal offense, courts’ assumption of a causal 
link appears misplaced.”).  This direct causal account, in turn, is similar to the perspective that has 
guided the operation of most drug treatment courts in the United States since they first appeared in 
1989.  In the context of drug treatment courts, this perspective describes the relationship between 
drug addiction and criminal conduct as causal, and asserts that effective substance abuse treatment 
leads to reduced criminal recidivism.  See J. Scott Sanford & Bruce A. Arrigo, Lifting the Cover 
on Drug Courts: Evaluation Findings and Policy Concerns, 49 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & 
COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 239, 251 (2005) (discussing recidivism studies suggesting that “successful 
graduates of the [drug court] program are less likely to reoffend and, thus, less likely to be recon-
victed and incarcerated”).  In fact, “[t]he correlation is complex, as there are a number of ‘predis-
posing’ factors that are common both to substance abuse and to criminal involvement.”  Boldt, 
supra note 50, at 45 (citing Candido Da Agra, The Complex Structures, Processes and Meanings 
of the Drug/Crime Relationship, in DRUGS AND CRIME DEVIANT PATHWAYS 9 (Serge Brochu et 
al. eds., 2002)).   
 203.  One group of researchers reported that only about ten percent of offenders with mental 
illness engage in criminal conduct as a direct consequence of their disability.  See Jennifer L. 
Skeem et al., Correctional Policy for Offenders with Mental Illness: Creating a New Paradigm for 
Recidivism Reduction, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 110, 117–18 (2010) (identifying a study that 
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category of offenders, which is much larger, is comprised of offenders 
whose criminal conduct is best understood as only indirectly the result of 
mental illness.204  In the case of these individuals, the effects of their mental 
disorders generally are mediated by factors either brought about by their 
underlying illness or at least associated with it, such as homelessness, low 
educational attainment, weak family and community ties, and the like.205  A 
third category is made up of offenders who suffer both from mental illness-
es and co-occurring substance use disorders and/or personality disorders.206  
Here again, it is difficult to attribute direct causal significance to this 
group’s mental illnesses, given that their co-occurring disorders also con-
tribute in important ways to their criminal system involvement.207 
The alternative perspective that informs practice in Burns’s mental 
health/homeless courts is consistent with this more nuanced understanding 
of the complex associations among mental illness, social and economic dis-
location, and criminal system involvement.  In effect, the best evidence is 
that a number of the risk factors most associated with criminality (substance 
misuse, weak family ties, and so forth) are also associated with severe men-
tal illness.208  Understood in this fashion, while mental illness simpliciter is 
not highly predictive of criminal recidivism, mental illness does play an 
important indirect role in fostering a set of circumstances that are positively 
associated with criminal justice involvement.  Not surprisingly, programs 
that target this broad spectrum of “criminogenic needs” produce greater 
“treatment effects” than do programs that are more narrowly focused on 
mental illness and medication management alone.209 
Because mental illness does not hold a simple, causal relationship with 
criminality (the first premise typically advocated by mental health court ad-
vocates), medication management and other treatment interventions target-
                                                          
found out of 113 arrestees with mental illness, “8% had been arrested for offenses that their psy-
chiatric symptoms probably-to-definitely caused, either directly (4%) or indirectly (4%)”). 
 204.  Johnston, supra note 177, at 560. 
 205.  Id. at 573.  A significant percentage of offenders with mental illness become enmeshed in 
the criminal justice system because their mental disabilities “contributed to their job loss, decline 
into poverty, and/or movement into environments rife with antisocial influences, all generic risk 
factors for criminal justice involvement.”  Id. at 560.  
 206.  Id. at 560. 
 207.  See id. (discussing and citing the findings of William H. Fisher et al., Community Mental 
Health Services and Criminal Justice Involvement Among Persons with Mental Illness, in 
COMMUNITY-BASED INTERVENTIONS FOR CRIMINAL OFFENDERS WITH SEVERE MENTAL 
ILLNESS 43–44 (William H. Fisher ed., 2003)). 
 208.  See Skeem et al., supra note 203, at 116–18 (identifying evidence “that major predicators 
of violence and recidivism are not unique to offenders with mental illness, but instead shared with 
general offenders”). 
 209.  See Johnston, supra note 177, at 574–75 (“Studies show that the most effective programs 
for reducing recidivism are those that target the specific risks and needs predictive of criminali-
ty.”). 
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ing participants’ mental illness, taken in isolation, are unlikely to produce 
robust and sustainable reductions in recidivism (the second premise).210  In-
stead, courts that formulate a broader and more comprehensive understand-
ing of the problem, and thereby seek to address a fuller range of associated 
needs contributing to the dysfunction and distress of the offenders before 
them, are more likely to have a measurable impact on the daily functioning 
of these individuals.211  Moreover, if the definition of the problem is in-
formed by an acknowledgement that the relationship between mental disor-
der and criminal system involvement is not directly causal in most cases, 
but instead is mediated by a range of associated characteristics, then the 
identification of appropriate goals is also likely to take on a broader, more 
comprehensive cast, to include not just (or even primarily) a reduction in 
criminal recidivism.212 
In order to make sense of the contrast between Burns’s “Whatever It 
Takes Court” and other problem-solving courts that offer more punitive re-
sponses to noncompliant clients, it is good to recall the essential features of 
pragmatist theory identified earlier.  Pragmatism, in Richard Posner’s con-
ception, is distrustful of essentialist thinking, centered on the consequential-
ity of ideas, and committed to evaluating practices by reference “to social or 
other human needs rather than to ‘objective,’ ‘impersonal’ criteria.”213  In 
John Dewey’s terms, pragmatist theory provides principles to direct social 
practices, including the operation of legal institutions, by grounding deci-
sions in carefully formulated “ends-in-view.”214  Fundamental choices faced 
by all problem-solving courts with respect to the nature of the problems 
they address and the definitions of success and failure that govern their 
practice “cannot be done once for all,” but must “be done, and done over 
                                                          
 210.  See Skeem et al., supra note 203, at 114 (recognizing that different treatments may re-
duce recidivism, but “there is no evidence that they do so by linking individuals with evidence-
based psychiatric treatment or by achieving symptom reduction”); see also Johnston, supra note 
177, at 573 (“[T]he provision of mental health treatment alone is not an effective strategy for re-
ducing the recidivism of offenders with mental illnesses.”). 
 211.  See Skeem et al., supra note 203, at 121 (finding that “the effectiveness of correctional 
programs in reducing recidivism is positively associated with the number of criminogenic needs 
they target”). 
 212.  Johnston explains the point as follows: 
[B]y broadening the stated goals of mental health courts beyond decreasing arrests or 
incidents of reconviction—which some mental health courts do—a theory of rehabilita-
tion could potentially justify mental health courts as currently constituted.  . . . [O]ther 
measures of social welfare—such as improvement in aspects of offenders’ psychologi-
cal health, conduct, and life-style—could also serve as viable measures of success.  
Mental health courts may succeed at enhancing the human potential, psychological 
health, or welfare of offenders, even in the face of static re-arrest rates. 
Johnston, supra note 177, at 576–77. 
 213.  Posner, supra note 35, at 1660–61. 
 214.  DEWEY, supra note 101, at 220. 
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and over and over again, in terms of the conditions of concrete situations as 
they arise.”215 
Decisionmakers with responsibility for shaping practice in problem-
solving courts, who wish to exploit the potential of pragmatist theory, 
should explore the divergent perspectives of stakeholders in the process of 
developing their respective ends-in-view, and should then proceed on the 
basis of a plan designed to accomplish those identified ends-in-view.  Offi-
cials in charge of a particular drug treatment court, mental health court, or 
domestic violence court should be committed to formulating such principles 
for practice based on their best assessment of what would be most likely to 
serve the “social or other human needs” of persons affected by their court.  
But the plan once formulated cannot be the end of the story.  Effective mor-
al judgment, explained Dewey, requires that the consequences of one’s 
choices must be examined and the ends-in-view revised, so that ongoing 
practice reflects the learning derived from the data of prior experience.216  It 
may be that the approach to working with chronic mentally ill homeless cli-
ents adopted by the problem-solving courts described by Burns will not fit 
perfectly the needs of clients and other stakeholders in other problem-
solving courts, but attention to this alternative does force into the open an 
expanded array of ends-in-view that thoughtful planners ought to consider.  
Pragmatist theory encourages such a process of consideration, mindful al-
ways of the important role that perspective and context play in shaping de-
cision-makers’ understandings of the relevance of the information they 
evaluate.217 
                                                          
 215.  Id. at 212. 
 216.  In some respects this process is consistent with the “democratic experimentalism” urged 
by Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel.  See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug 
Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 834 n.3 
(2000) (discussing democratic experimentalism’s decentralized approach).  Dorf and Sabel’s idea 
is that “[d]emocratic experimentalism takes place through the pooling of information among indi-
viduals from different professions and social positions so as to encourage continuous learning and 
self-correcting from all perspectives.  These internal negotiations permit a new consensus to 
emerge in relation to an overall goal.”  Victoria Malkin, Community Courts and the Process of 
Accountability: Consensus and Conflict at the Red Hook Community Justice Center, 40 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2003).  Dorf and Sabel’s suggestion that democratic experimentalism 
well describes interactions in operating drug treatment courts or other problem-solving courts 
seems “overly optimistic.”  Id. at 1580.  It “assumes a general consensus about the existence and 
nature of [the] problem” and “thus assume[s] away much of the normative content” involved in 
framing the work of these enterprises.  David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic 
Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 553–54 (2008).  In 
addition, in the absence of a conscious decision by those involved in these problem-solving pro-
jects with the most political and social power to adopt something like a pragmatist theoretical 
methodology, this kind of internal democratic negotiation is unlikely to occur.  See id. 
 217.  See Sanford & Arrigo, supra note 202, at 248 (explaining how drug court outcomes rely 
heavily on “the informed and integrated process of the drug court management team”). 
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B.  The Red Hook Community Justice Center 
Attention to context and perspective is important in assessing problem-
solving courts other than drug treatment courts and mental health courts.218  
Community courts are one well-established variation on the problem-
solving court model,219 and the well-publicized community court located in 
Red Hook, New York, is an especially prominent example of this catego-
ry.220  Community courts are an unusual manifestation of the problem-
solving courts methodology in that they combine the promise of community 
development (and consequently evoke a consideration of restorative justice) 
and individual rehabilitation (thereby creating an association with therapeu-
tic jurisprudence).221  Although community courts vary considerably along 
a number of dimensions,222 one common feature that tends to distinguish 
these undertakings from most other problem-solving courts is their adoption 
of either an actual or aspirational goal of involving the community, howev-
er defined, in the process by which the court’s agenda, priorities, and prac-
                                                          
 218.  AUBREY FOX, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, A TALE OF THREE CITIES: DRUGS, COURTS, 
AND COMMUNITY JUSTICE 2 (2010) (describing the development of the problem-solving court 
movement beyond drug courts). 
 219.  For an early and influential discussion of community courts, see David B. Rottman, 
Community Courts: Prospects and Limits, 231 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 46, 46 (1996) (claiming that 
community courts are part of the country’s judicial history and that they are on the rise).  For a 
more recent account, see FOX, supra note 218, at 2 (reporting that over forty community courts 
now operate in the nation or are being planned). 
 220.  See Greg Berman & Aubrey Fox, From the Benches and Trenches: Justice in Red Hook, 
26 JUST. SYS. J. 77, 77 (2005) (describing the origins of the Red Hook Community Justice Cen-
ter).  In 2009, the National Institute of Justice funded a comprehensive evaluation of the Red 
Hook Community Justice Center.  This evaluation, which was conducted by the National Center 
for State Courts in partnership with the Center for Court Innovation and the John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice, provides a detailed description of the Red Hook Community Court.  The report 
of this evaluation was published in September of 2013.  See CYNTHIA G. LEE ET AL., NAT’L CTR. 
FOR ST. CTS., A COMMUNITY COURT GROWS IN BROOKLYN: A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION 
OF THE RED HOOK COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER (FINAL REPORT) 4–9 (2013) (describing the 
Red Hook Community Justice Center through a focus on its principles of deterrence, intervention, 
and legitimacy).  The prominence of the Red Hook project has been due in significant part, no 
doubt, to its sponsorship by the Center for Court Innovation.  See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 34, 
at 915–16 (explaining the Center for Court Innovation’s choice to sponsor the Red Hook Commu-
nity Justice Center).  The Center for Court Innovation is a public-private partnership established in 
1996 by the New York State Unified Court System and the Fund for New York City, “to promote 
new thinking about how the justice system can respond more effectively to chronic problems like 
addiction, delinquency, child neglect, domestic violence, and truancy.”  Nancy L. Fishman, Re-
ducing Juvenile Detention: Notes from an Experiment on Staten Island, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
1475, 1484 (2012). 
 221.  See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 34, at 906–07 (discussing the emphasis community 
courts place on helping the whole community through their sanctions and assisting individual of-
fenders through tailored treatment programs). 
 222.  See Malkin, supra note 216, at 1574 (noting that community courts constitute “an amor-
phous group” with “a wide variety of operational models”). 
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tices are identified and/or formulated.223  In one respect, these courts are 
understood as “community courts” because they are community located; 
that is, they are situated physically in a particular neighborhood or geo-
graphical community.  More broadly, they can be said to be “community 
courts” to the extent that they rely on various actors in their relevant com-
munities to provide crucial information that otherwise might not find its 
way into the operation of the criminal justice system.224  Most expansively, 
these courts can be characterized as “community courts” if the communities 
in which they are located are accorded significant authority (and responsi-
bility) for framing the problems to be addressed and identifying the solu-
tions to be effectuated.225 
In the case of the Red Hook Community Justice Center, the communi-
ty has served as the location for the court and as a source of information, 
but has not consistently exercised significant authority in determining the 
fundamental design of the project.226  From the start, the proponents of the 
Red Hook Court identified community development as a key goal for the 
day-to-day operation of the court.227  All the same, there has been “no clear 
mandate for what role the community should play either in the formulation 
of the problem to be solved or in the strategies and policies chosen to ad-
dress these goals.”228  Project officials have periodically held meetings of a 
                                                          
 223.  See ERIC LEE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CMTY. JUST. SERIES, COMMUNITY COURTS: AN 
EVOLVING MODEL 5, 5 (2000) (explaining how community courts are shaped around the prob-
lems of particular communities); Malkin, supra note 19, at 142–45 (describing how, in theory, 
community courts’ programs shift in accordance with community members’ concerns, and how 
the community is viewed as a participant in the courts’ processes). 
 224.  See Malkin, supra note 19, at 144–45 (explaining how community feedback about com-
munity courts’ programs may provide important information to the courts to help them design and 
administer their programs). 
 225.  The Center for Court Innovation’s Principles of Problem-Solving Justice include the 
principles of “[e]nhanced [i]nformation,” which subsumes “knowledge about the community con-
text of crime[,]” and “[c]ommunity [e]ngagement[,]” which focuses on the “important role” that 
citizens and neighborhood groups have “in helping the justice system identify, prioritize, and 
solve local problems.”  WOLF, supra note 5, at 2–5. 
 226.  As Malkin concludes: 
My observations demonstrate that the court’s physical integration into the community 
informs the court about local issues, and encourages community participation and 
community input, all of which have an impact on courtroom operations.  But I also 
show that while a court and community may agree in their diagnoses of the primary 
problem, their proposed solutions often diverge considerably.  
Malkin, supra note 216, at 1578; see also Malkin, supra note 19, at 144–45 (noting that, with re-
spect to the Red Hook Court, “community participation did not translate into community authority 
or power and should not be mistaken for this as was frequently the assumption in popular rheto-
ric”).   
 227.  See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 34, at 924–25 (reporting that community leaders sought 
a community development role for the Red Hook Court through provision of special programs and 
social services). 
 228.  Malkin, supra note 19, at 144. 
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“Community Advisory Board,” at which information about the court and its 
programs has been conveyed to attendees and feedback from members of 
the community elicited.229  Significantly, however, these “interactions with 
the community were focused more on building consensus and support for 
the court than as a mechanism meant to lead to more power sharing or de-
vise common goals.”230  As a consequence, “community participation did 
not translate into community authority or power.”231 
As Victoria Malkin has pointed out, a true “participatory model” re-
quires a decisionmaking process in which “goals and/or strategies are de-
cided together through a deliberative process between different groups.”232  
For a community court to be participatory in this sense, it would have to ex-
tend to the community (or effective representatives of various community 
interests) “both the authority and the flexibility to change certain taken-for-
granted ways of doing things.”233  Voices from the community, in short, 
would have to have the capacity to “reset [the] agenda” in a fashion con-
sistent with identified consensus goals.234  This sort of participatory struc-
ture is a central feature of Deweyan pragmatist democratic theory, and 
characterizes John Dewey’s work on democratic institutions.235  Inherent in 
this vision of practice is an obligation to design institutions and social and 
political processes that facilitate the gathering of data from a variety of 
stakeholders, so that ongoing decisionmaking reflects the lessons derived 
from those participating in and impacted by these institutions.236 
                                                          
 229.  Id. (explaining how the Community Advisory Board held meetings, on a quarterly basis 
when possible, to inform the community about its programs and receive feedback). 
 230.  Id.  It is clear that these consensus-building efforts have succeeded in gaining local sup-
port for the project.  The Center for Court Innovation reports that “in a recent door-to-door survey 
of more than 600 local residents, 94 percent said they approved of the community court in their 
neighborhood.”  FOX, supra note 218, at 5.  The recently released evaluation of the Red Hook 
Community Court reports that “the Justice Center [has been successful] in integrating itself into 
the fabric of the Red Hook community,” and that the Justice Center “is viewed by Red Hook resi-
dents as a community institution belonging to the neighborhood itself, not as an outpost of city 
government placed there by policymakers with little understanding of the community’s needs and 
priorities.”  LEE ET AL., supra note 220, at 65, 182.  Although gaining this sort of support is im-
portant to the success of the project, and likely reflects sincere efforts to engage various stake-
holders in the community, “community court processes are still subject to the realities of power.  
Accordingly, some individuals exert more influence over the ‘consensus’ reached than others for 
political, structural, economic and cultural reasons.”  Malkin, supra note 216, at 1580. 
 231.  Malkin, supra note 19, at 144–45. 
 232.  Id. at 145.   
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  See WESTBROOK, supra note 85, at 433 (“All those who are affected by social institutions 
must have a share in producing and managing them[.]” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 236.  See id. (discussing the importance to Dewey of individuals’ influence in shaping the in-
stitutions that regulate them); see also Boldt, supra note 35, at 48–50 (describing Deweyan liberty 
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Pragmatism’s anti-essentialism and contextualism place great empha-
sis on perspective, the conscious and unconscious lenses through which de-
cisionmakers address the work of moral and political judgment.237  These 
judgments necessarily depend on an evaluation of experiential data which, 
in turn, is sorted, filtered, and assembled into coherent narratives based on 
the decisionmakers’ location within the social, cultural, and physical envi-
ronments in which they operate.238  Given the absence of any essential a 
priori foundations for decision, pragmatist theory places a heavy emphasis 
on the question of who the decisionmakers will be and what the experiential 
basis is for their exercise of discretion.  The process by which important de-
cisions are reached, which includes a consideration of who the deci-
sionmakers are and how they entertain each other’s perspectives, therefore 
is as important as the substance of the decisions themselves.239  Indeed, 
pragmatism’s anti-essentialist and contextualist premises contemplate that 
the process and the substance of decisionmaking are not distinct considera-
tions, but rather are integrated components of the enterprise of making mor-
al and political judgments.240 
Perhaps the most fundamental decision with respect to the design and 
operation of the Red Hook Community Court has concerned the selection of 
a vantage point—on a continuum extending from broad, community-wide 
challenges at one end to individual troubles at the other—from which to 
                                                          
as requiring a deep level of participation by citizens in governing their social institutions).  In the 
case of the Red Hook project:  
During the planning process, the Justice Center’s planners sought out the perspective of 
all segments of the community—not just influential community leaders—in a series of 
focus groups.  Before the court began hearing cases, the Youth Court and the Red Hook 
Public Safety Corps were established as concrete responses to two areas of community 
concerns: jobs and a lack of positive development opportunities for youth.  The court’s 
handling of housing disputes between residents of public housing and the New York 
City’s Housing Authority helped to establish the court’s reputation as a resource for 
solving community problems. Numerous other community and youth programs, from 
the court’s involvement in cleaning up a nearby park to its summer internship program 
for youth, further integrate the court into the fabric of the community.  
CYNTHIA G. LEE ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., A COMMUNITY COURT GROWS IN 
BROOKLYN: A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF THE RED HOOK COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER 
(EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) 10 (2013). 
 237.  One of the core assumptions of essentialist thought challenged by pragmatist theory is 
that there is a clear distinction between objective knowledge and subjective understanding.  See 
Minow & Spelman, supra note 35, at 1620 (noting how contextualist theories challenge the objec-
tivity/subjectivity duality, and remain cognizant of the context-influenced perspectives of the pro-
ducers of texts). 
 238.  See id. at 1628 (“[T]he contextualist uses categories to select which particular details 
matter.”). 
 239.  See JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 45 (1963) (arguing that social in-
quiry is not outside of social processes, and that conclusions should reflect this fact). 
 240.  See Boldt, supra note 35, at 44 (suggesting that Deweyan thought evades the process-
substance dualism). 
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frame the problems selected for attention.241  Those associated with this 
project have suggested from its inception that shared problems confronting 
the community as a whole, including the effects of persistent economic and 
social disinvestment, would be as salient and entitled to as much attention 
in the problem-solving agenda as the problems of individual pathology 
(most prominently drug use disorders) plaguing many of the individual of-
fenders brought before the court.242  To be sure, the challenges faced by the 
community as a whole and the difficulties experienced by distinct individu-
als in that community are not separate pathologies; rather, they are by ne-
cessity interconnected problems.243  The choice of where on this spectrum 
to focus the resources of this community-based problem-solving enterprise, 
however, is nonetheless a consequential decision that shapes the very nature 
of its daily activities.244  This foundational decision conceivably could be 
negotiated (and re-negotiated over time as experience informs ongoing 
practice) by community representatives accorded a meaningful role in the 
development of this project.245  Instead, law enforcement officials, court 
administration personnel, the judge, lawyers, and probation, parole and hu-
man services professionals associated with the Red Hook project have, to a 
significant degree, driven the planning and operation of the court.246  These 
actors have pursued this work according to a set of perspectives that are dis-
tinct from those that shape the understanding of many community members, 
and that derive from professional and institutional backgrounds far removed 
from the neighborhood in Red Hook, Brooklyn, where this court is physi-
cally located.247 
                                                          
 241.  See Malkin, supra note 19, at 154–55 (explaining the difference between collective ac-
tion and action focused on the individual). 
 242.  See Berman & Fox, supra note 220, at 81–83 (describing the various programs associated 
with the Red Hook Justice Center). 
 243.  See Malkin, supra note 19, at 148 (describing how individual actions before the court 
were used to address quality of life problems for the community). 
 244.  See id. (listing the types of cases heard by the court). 
 245.  See id. at 144–45 (hypothesizing the possible role of the community). 
 246.  See id. at 145 (criticizing the court’s lack of autonomy, which would have permitted it 
more effectively to share authority with the community). 
 247.  Red Hook is a waterfront neighborhood situated at the tip of a peninsula between But-
termilk Channel and the Gowanus Canal in the southern part of Brooklyn, New York.  Robin L. 
Wachen, The Future of Red Hook, Brooklyn: Learning From Evolving New York City Neighbor-
hoods 84 (June 1, 2012) (unpublished thesis, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis 
Obispo), available at http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1820& 
context=theses.  It is cut off from the rest of Brooklyn by two major highways.  Id.  At one time a 
busy shipping center, the neighborhood “was home to dockworkers and their families who lived in 
tenements, row houses, brick townhouses, and a 39-acre public housing complex . . . .”  Id. at 85 
(citation omitted).  According to the 2010 census, nearly seventy percent of the residents in Red 
Hook live in the public housing complex, the largest in Brooklyn, called Red Hook Houses.  Id. at 
86, 99.  Roughly one-third of the men and women of Red Hook in the labor force are unemployed.  
Avi Brisman, Fictionalized Criminal Law and Youth Legal Consciousness, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
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According to Richard Rorty, a pragmatist approach to political and 
moral judgment “emphasizes the utility of narratives and vocabularies ra-
ther than the objectivity of laws and theories.”248  A narrative functions as a 
coherent account of a history, a present circumstance calling for action, or a 
future expected to unfold that is developed by individuals or groups in light 
of their perspectives and their social, economic, and political positions.249  
The narrative animating decisionmaking with respect to the Red Hook 
Community Justice Center reflects the perspectives and understandings of 
the project’s developers and professional agents.250  Other narratives, how-
ever, are also present in the Red Hook community, and, if they were to 
shape the field of vision of decisionmakers, presumably would yield a 
somewhat different institutional structure and a somewhat different prac-
tice.251 
The narrative that has dominated practice in the Red Hook court is 
centered on the concept of “quality-of-life” and on the corrosive effect that 
certain crimes work on the health of a community.252  This narrative links 
the decline in Red Hook and other similar urban communities in the United 
States in the last quarter of the twentieth century to the aggregate effects of 
widespread substance misuse, street crime, and dysfunctional families.253  
                                                          
REV. 1039, 1048 (2011).  Over sixty percent of families in the neighborhood with children report-
ed incomes below the federal poverty line.  Id.  In the early 1990s, the New York artists’ commu-
nity began to establish a presence in Red Hook, as the Brooklyn Waterfront Artists Coalition be-
gan staging art exhibits and artists moved into the neighborhood seeking inexpensive studio and 
residential space.  Wachen, supra, at 103.  In the late 1990s, some New York real estate experts 
predicted that Red Hook would soon experience the sort of gentrification that has been seen in 
Williamsburg and elsewhere in Brooklyn.  Id. at 19.  By and large, this development has not oc-
curred, probably because the neighborhood is “isolated from the rest of Brooklyn by highways, 
and [has] few public transportation options . . . .”  Id.  Nevertheless, some small condominium 
development and other signs of economic recovery have been apparent in the neighborhood in 
recent years.  Joseph De Avila, Pluses and Minuses of Red Hook’s Seclusion, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
6, 2010, 12:01 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703805704575594343891065062.  
 248.  Richard Rorty, Method, Social Science, Social Hope, in CONSEQUENCES OF 
PRAGMATISM (ESSAYS: 1972–1980) 195 (1982).   
 249.  See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Power of Narrative in Empathetic Learning: Post-
Modernism and the Stories of Law, 2 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 287, 304–07 (1992) (reviewing 
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 
(1991), and urging use of a narrative). 
 250.  See Malkin, supra note 19, at 144–45 (emphasizing how the Justice Center’s developers 
shaped the program). 
 251.  See id. at 152 (describing the way Red Hook community members envisioned the court). 
 252.  See id. at 151, 154–55 (describing how the Red Hook Justice Center has approached 
quality-of-life crimes). 
 253.  See id. at 145–47 (relaying the history of crime and urban decay in the United States).  
Further, as Robin Wachen describes, “[t]he rampant presence of drugs and crime in the neighbor-
hood since the 1980s has been widely reported in the media, including a nine-page article in Life 
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Although broad societal changes, including economic restructuring and the 
resulting loss of working-class jobs, white flight, and the re-segregation of 
public schools, have been associated with these problems,254 the “quality of 
life narrative” places primary emphasis on public disorder, on low-level in-
dividual street crime, as the most salient issue to be addressed.255  Individu-
al problems such as alcohol and other drug misuse that are thought to con-
tribute to street crime and public disorder, and the consequent diminishing 
quality of life, are therefore made a centerpiece of public policy initiatives 
designed to promote the development of healthy urban communities.256 
The “Broken Windows” theory of crime control, adopted by New 
York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in the mid-1990s, reflects the essential pow-
er of this narrative.257  According to the “Broken Windows” theory, small 
instances of public disorder, including panhandling, loitering, and public 
substance use, contribute to a more general decline in social control and 
foster more serious violence and social dislocation.258  In response, inten-
sive police attention to low-level offenses is deployed in order to stabilize 
public spaces and encourage social cohesion.259  As applied in the commu-
nity court context, the promise of vigorous community policing was cou-
pled with the notion that “many people who commit crimes of particular-
ized concern in the court’s local space can be rehabilitated, and that once 
rehabilitated, those people who are residents or victims can exert a form of 
informal social control that will ultimately reduce crime.”260  Importantly, 
this model of community policing coupled with community court pro-
cessing of the resulting criminal cases rested on the assumption “that fear of 
                                                          
magazine published in July 1988 entitled ‘Crack: Downfall of a Neighborhood.’”  Wachen, supra 
note 247, at 87. 
 254.  Robin Wachen has succinctly recounted the striking decline of Red Hook: 
  By the 1980s, the neighborhood had become desolate and poor with few employ-
ment opportunities . . . .  In 1985, the Todd Shipyards closed down, which had provided 
employment opportunities since the 1860s . . . .  The closure further limited local em-
ployment opportunities . . . . 
  Gunfire became a common occurrence in the neighborhood in the 1990s and was a 
constant concern for residents living in public housing.   
Wachen, supra note 247, at 101 (citations omitted). 
 255.  See Malkin, supra note 19, at 146–47 (describing New York City’s approach to quality-
of-life policing). 
 256.  See id. at 146 (detailing how individual crimes such as fare hopping were thought to con-
tribute to larger crimes and the decline of neighborhoods). 
 257.  See id. at 146–47 (analyzing “Broken Windows”). 
 258.  Id. at 146. 
 259.  See id. at 146–47 (explaining that police had previously not acted on low-level offenses); 
see also Malkin, supra note 216, at 1574 (“The so-called ‘broken windows’ theory links disorder 
and crime prevention by arguing that signs of social disorder encourage crime and should be man-
aged through coercive social control (policing and the law).”). 
 260.  Fagan & Malkin, supra note 34, at 909. 
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the legal system does not promote compliance in neighborhoods with high 
crime rates.  Social ties among citizens and their dynamic expressions of 
social control contribute in separate and different ways from legal control to 
produce lower crime rates.”261 
The adoption of the “Broken Windows” approach to policing, howev-
er, when coupled with a pre-existing set of legal and public policy commit-
ments to fighting a “war on drugs,” ultimately led to a significant increase 
in the number of arrests, often for relatively minor offenses, in Red Hook 
and throughout distressed communities in New York City.262  Court plan-
ners in Red Hook “had not anticipated such high numbers of drug arrests,” 
but when confronted with this reality met the influx of arrested individuals 
by adopting a drug treatment court model.263  Pursuant to this model, and 
given the exigencies of the situation, the court became “more concerned 
with placing defendants into therapeutic groups” than with providing com-
munity services.264  Meanwhile, “[c]ommunity residents’ expectations that 
a wide range of services would be available on site became increasingly less 
of a reality as the Court drifted toward a structural and jurisprudential mod-
el already established in other treatment courts.”265 
In contrast to the quality-of-life narrative that has framed the planning 
and operation of the Red Hook court, some in this community have under-
stood the challenges they face within the context of a different narrative that 
places “larger social structural problems” rather than individual behaviors at 
the center of the story.266  Where the former narrative depicts quality-of-life 
violations such as public urination or the possession of an open alcohol con-
tainer as acts of individual wrongdoing that contribute to broader social dis-
organization, the latter narrative unsettles that causal account and locates 
                                                          
 261.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 262.  See id. at 925 (“The Court caseloads were dominated . . . by drug arrests made from tres-
pass sweeps taking place in Red Hook public housing and elsewhere . . . .”). 
 263.  Id. at 926. 
 264.  Id.  Aubrey Fox, Director for Special Projects at the Center for Court Innovation, has 
conceded that “the Red Hook Community Justice Center operates much like a drug court.”  FOX, 
supra note 218, at 2.  He goes on to argue, however, that: 
Red Hook differs from the drug court model [in] some crucial ways.  It has a broader 
caseload (many of the offenders at Red Hook are not drug-addicted) and its community 
location allows it to get involved in a range of crime prevention activities that are be-
yond the scope of the typical drug court. 
Id. 
 265.  Fagan & Malkin, supra note 34, at 927.  This is not to suggest that the goal of providing 
community services beyond the court function was abandoned.  The Red Hook Community Court 
does serve as a community center offering a range of programs and services.  These programs in-
clude (or have included in the past) a youth court, a teen leadership and community organizing 
program, a police-teen theater project, a GED program, an AmeriCorps program, and a youth 
baseball league.  Brisman, supra note 247, at 1048–49. 
 266.  Malkin, supra note 19, at 150–51. 
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these individual events within a story primarily about inadequate (and de-
clining) public resources, unacknowledged (and often unconscious) class 
and race bias in law enforcement practices, and the collapse of an effective 
economic infrastructure in some portions of urban America.267  Where the 
former narrative emphasizes the ways in which disruptive individuals con-
tribute to neighborhood decline, the alternative narrative highlights a more 
systematic failure of community institutions and the consequent absence of 
civic engagement, as well as the corrosive effects on families and neighbor-
hoods of a frayed social safety net and an invasive and misdirected criminal 
enforcement system.268 
These competing narratives, and, presumably, others, have coexisted 
within the shared social and political space within which the Red Hook 
Community Court project has operated.  In the absence of a systematic the-
ory of decisionmaking, however, the divergent frames of reference offered 
by each have not been made readily apparent, and the differing policy 
choices likely to result from the selection of one perspective or another have 
not been entertained with full awareness.269  The analytic force of Emerson 
and Messinger’s work on the Micro-Politics of Trouble presses this point 
into focus and makes clear the consequences of constructing “problem-
solving” processes without sufficient attention to how context and perspec-
tive, the essential features of pragmatist theory, organize our understanding 
of problems and their respective solutions.270 
The starting point for Emerson and Messinger is their recognition that 
the process by which a problem, or “trouble” in their terms, comes to be 
understood and responded to is dynamic and interactive, rather than focused 
on fixed and stable phenomena.271  In their account: 
 A difficulty arises, a remedy is sought and applied; it works 
temporarily or not at all; then some new remedy is sought.  The 
                                                          
 267.  See id. at 154–55; see also Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts 
on Community Courts, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 63, 90 (2002) (critiquing the community court 
approach). 
 268.  See Malkin, supra note 19, at 155 (comparing generally an individual-focused approach 
and a collective approach). 
 269.  Fagan & Malkin, supra note 34, at 910 n.61 (“While writers . . . see these courts as focus-
ing on quality-of-life issues that nag communities and invite more serious crime, this is a limited 
perspective that fails to establish a comparative advantage for community courts.  To truly depart 
from regular court parts, drug treatment courts, or other specialized parts, community courts have 
to be focused on a specific location and guided by the partnerships formed with individuals and 
groups in this space.”). 
 270.  See Emerson & Messinger, supra note 36, at 125 (describing as complicating factors the 
“partial and retrospective character of troubles and accounts of their development” and noting that 
“[p]articular versions of what the trouble is, how it arose, and what was done in response, are like-
ly to be highly partisan and hotly contested”). 
 271.  See id. at 128 (referring to this as “the negotiated (rather than intrinsic) nature of prob-
lems”). 
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result tends to be a recurring cycle of trouble . . . .  As a conse-
quence of these processes, the trouble is progressively elaborated, 
analyzed, and specified as to type and cause—‘organized’ to use 
the term Balint . . . has applied to the early stages of illness.272 
Moreover, they explain, the process of “organizing, identifying, and 
consolidating the trouble” is itself critically influenced by the very “effort to 
find and implement a remedy.”273  As a consequence, and consistent with 
the insights of Deweyan pragmatism, “any initial formulation of what the 
trouble ‘really is’ is conditional upon the subsequent effects of the attempt-
ed remedy.”274 
In addition to the dynamic and cyclical nature of problem definition 
and remedial intervention, Emerson and Messinger point out that 
“[u]nderstanding these matters is complicated by the partial and retrospec-
tive character of troubles and accounts of their development.”275  In part this 
is because claims about the existence of a problem, its costs, and its causes 
are likely to be “embedded in and products of the troubled situation it-
self.”276  In addition, the contested understandings of a problem must be 
read against the often complex and intersecting roles that different agents 
play with respect to the problem and the various interventions by which it is 
both brought into focus and potentially resolved.277  These various roles—
”complainant,” “victim,” “troubleshooter,” and “troublemaker”—may be 
occupied by separate and distinct persons or entities, or they may over-
lap.278  The victim, understood as an individual, a collection of individuals, 
or an entire community, may or may not be the same actor as the complain-
ant, whose role is to announce the presence of the trouble by seeking reme-
dial action.279  In instances in which the victim and the complainant are 
separate actors, the latter’s conclusion that a problem is present or is signif-
icant enough to call for a solution may not even be shared by the former.280  
Moreover, the individual or entity identified by the complainant as the vic-
tim may or may not end up being the same party that the remedy agent or 
                                                          
 272.  Id. at 122 (citation omitted). 
 273.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 274.  Id. at 123. 
 275.  Id. at 125. 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  See id. at 126 (“[W]hen an outside party moves from giving advice to active intervention 
the structure of the trouble undergoes significant change.”). 
 278.  See id. (stating that “[t]he complainant role may be distinct from the role of victim” and 
that “one party to the trouble may come to be designated the troublemaker” (emphasis omitted)). 
 279.  Id. 
 280.  See id. at 125 (stating that the actors may not agree on what the trouble is or that it ex-
ists). 
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troubleshooter designates as the primary object of the remedy.281  Even the 
role of the troublemaker potentially is unstable and subject to contest.  In-
deed, in some problem-solving courts, most notably so-called prostitution 
courts, the overlap between troublemaker and victim is especially unsettled, 
as participants seek to work out a coherent account of the relative culpabil-
ity and responsibilities of those enmeshed in the conflict.282 
Crucially, Emerson and Messinger point out that “[e]ven the initial 
choice of troubleshooter may prove highly consequential for the trouble.  
For the selection of a particular troubleshooter may preemptively impose a 
definition on a trouble previously open or contested.”283  Thus, for example, 
a decision to rely primarily on health-care providers to deal with drug use 
problems, instead of defaulting to police and criminal justice actors as pri-
mary troubleshooters, effectively changes the way in which persons strug-
gling with such problems are understood and alters the range of interven-
tions that are deemed appropriate to “the problem.”284  Moreover, Emerson 
and Messinger argue that “whether, where, and how a trouble enters subse-
quent referral networks” affects the way in which the problem comes to be 
understood and addressed.285  Thus, when a problem has proven to be re-
sistant to the initial efforts of the first line of troubleshooters, the tendency 
is to “pass intractable problems on to new, often more specialized, trouble-
shooters.”286  Following Goffman’s notion of a “circuit of agents,”287 they 
note, “troubles may be shifted from one agent to another, perhaps moving 
upward toward greater and greater specialization, perhaps toward increas-
ingly coercive and punitive outcomes.”288  As this process of referral to in-
creasingly specialized and potentially more coercive troubleshooters pro-
ceeds, the nature of the problem to be addressed evolves and the 
identification of the troublemaker as a “deviant” becomes more likely.289 
                                                          
 281.  See id. at 130 (“A troubleshooter may . . . reverse the proposed allocation of victim and 
wrongdoer roles.”). 
 282.  See Shdaimah, supra note 2, at 99–101 (“Although communities are certainly victims 
when there is prostitution, a person charged with prostitution is arguably as much a victim as an 
offender.”). 
 283.  Emerson & Messinger, supra note 36, at 127. 
 284.  See Nolan, supra note 170, at 39–40 (describing “Britain’s particular history of drug con-
trol, in which doctors have played a more central role, and where providing maintenance drugs for 
the ‘stable addict’ has been a more common practice”). 
 285.  Emerson & Messinger, supra note 36, at 127. 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 288.  Id. 
 289.  See id. (“In moving through a circuit of troubleshooters, an initially ambiguous trouble 
tends to crystallize . . . .  In this process, an individual may be definitely assigned the role of trou-
blemaker and explicitly identified as deviant.”). 
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In Red Hook, community leaders were consulted in the community 
court’s planning process and “[t]he Justice Center was the culmination of 
six years of community needs assessments and planning that included focus 
groups, surveys, and town hall meetings.”290  The community had made 
clear that their priorities were “prevention programs and new social ser-
vices.”291  Also, “Red Hook residents were not expecting the Court to solve 
crime[;]” instead, they expected it to provide community mediation efforts 
and to deliver a wide range of human services.292  That the eventual focus 
of this problem-solving enterprise turned out to be somewhat different from 
these community expectations suggests that the informal and often uncon-
scious process of negotiation by which the relevant “problems” were orga-
nized and addressed had become at least partly disengaged from those in the 
community who were held out nominally as both the victims and the com-
plainants of the troubles to be solved.293  In important respects, key opera-
tional choices made by court officials were driven by their need to manage 
caseloads “produced by police enforcement priorities” and the district attor-
ney’s “policy preferences for court-centered treatment of drug cases” rather 
than by an assessment that reflected the experiences and understandings of 
community leaders and other stakeholders in the various communities 
served by the court.294  Acting pursuant to a “crime reduction narrative”295 
in which quality-of-life crimes were seen by law enforcement officials as 
the central problem facing the community, these police and prosecutorial 
figures effectively assumed the role of complainant thereby reframing the 
problem presented to the court, acting as troubleshooter, as one largely of 
individual deviance and pathology.296 
                                                          
 290.  Fagan & Malkin, supra note 34, at 924. 
 291.  Id. 
 292.  Id. at 930. 
 293.  See id. at 927 (describing the community court’s shift from creative and innovative pro-
grams “toward a social service agency that efficiently allocated defendants to therapeutic pro-
grams”). 
 294.  Id. 
 295.  Id. at 931. 
 296.  Victoria Malkin tells the following story about one defendant who had received a court 
summons “for drinking in public during an annual father’s day barbecue in a public housing com-
plex.”  Malkin, supra note 19, at 150.  The man explained in an interview that: 
It was Father’s Day.  We have this barbecue annually.  It was like one or two in the af-
ternoon.  We were in a group, people sitting, playing basketball, you know, guys sitting 
around talking, had the kids there. . . .  I mean, people live in public housing. . . .  We 
don’t have a porch or backyard.  So the grounds is [sic] our porch and our backyard. 
Id. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Unlike other theoretical positions that begin with a fixed perspective 
and seek to work out an analysis of a practice according to the logic sup-
plied by that perspective, pragmatist theory directs our attention to the pro-
cesses through which a governing perspective is selected.  A pragmatist ap-
proach makes possible adjustments in complex practices in order to 
accommodate previously under-attended points of view.  As Wolff and Po-
gorzelski put it, “because process is a critical component of socially com-
plex interventions like mental health courts, evaluations must include a 
qualitative study that examines the internal workings of and the external in-
fluences on the court in order to identify the active ingredients within the 
proverbial ‘black box.’”297  Emerson and Messinger’s work on the dynamic 
processes by which problems are organized over time provides one set of 
lenses for studying the framing by which relevant problems and desired so-
lutions are adopted in problem-solving courts from Red Hook to the “What-
ever It Takes Court” in California. 
In Red Hook, the shift to a therapeutically-oriented court model, with 
its associated system of referrals to specialized troubleshooters, has served 
as a driving force in the process by which the relevant troubles have been 
organized as problems of individual deviance.  This sort of dynamic can be 
brought into view, and called into question, by interrogating the possibility 
of empowering other potential complainants and reconceiving the set of po-
tential victims relevant to the problems to be addressed by the court project.  
Attending to alternative narratives that are not centered on individual 
wrongdoing, but instead describe broad structural phenomena that either 
contribute to community cohesion or dysfunction, could support the adop-
tion of a revised agenda for this project that would better serve the human 
needs of its constituents.  Pragmatist theory offers the same opportunity for 
assessment and revision in other problem-solving courts, by drawing atten-
tion to the ways in which the data of everyday experience derived from 
those impacted by the enterprise can assist in recasting the nature of the 
problems to be addressed and the solutions to be sought. 
                                                          
 297.  Nancy Wolff & Wendy Pogorzelski, Measuring the Effectiveness of Mental Health 
Courts: Challenges and Recommendations, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 539, 541 (2005). 
